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INTRODUCTION
When a Navajo tribal member commits a serious felony against another
Navajo on the remote Navajo Indian Reservation, the crime sets in motion
not a tribal criminal investigation and tribal court proceeding, but a federal
investigation and federal court proceeding under the federal Major Crimes
Act.' For trial, the Navajo defendant, the Navajo victim, and the witnesses
(all of whom are also likely to be Navajo) will be summoned to a federal
district court far away from the reservation and the specific community
where the crime occurred. Unlike a felony involving only non-Indians,
which would be routinely adjudicated at the local county or district courthouse, the Navajo felony will be tried in a distant federal court in Phoenix,
Salt Lake City, or Albuquerque. 2
The federal court operates in a language that is foreign to many Navajos;
thus the Navajo defendants, victims, and witnesses may require interpreters
to translate the proceedings. Neither the judge, the court reporter, the prosecutor,3 the court security officers, the deputy marshals, nor the defense

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). Even if tribal police investigate the offense, the tribal police
may very well be acting with federal funding, administering a federal responsibility, and acting, in
effect, as federal agents. See, e.g., Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-379, 104
Stat. 473 (1990) (codified primarily at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (2000)).
2. Depending in part on the precise location where the crime occurred and in part on the
pleasure of the federal judge assigned to hear the matter, such a case might also be tried in Prescott,
Arizona, or Santa Fe, New Mexico, though these locations are also substantially distant from the
Navajo reservation.
3. The Navajo Nation is the second largest Indian tribe in the United States. It has a legal
culture so well established that it has long had its own bar examination and a court system with
numerous district courts and a supreme court that, together, hear tens of thousands civil and misdemeanor cases each year. See HARVARD LAW ScH., NAVAJO NATION COURTS (2004),

February 20061

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

attorney or investigator are likely to be Navajo or even understand or speak
the Navajo language. Perhaps even more importantly, the federal jury that
hears the evidence is unlikely to include a Navajo, or even an Indian, or any
other member of the community where the crime occurred .
While the Navajo Nation provides a compelling example of such alienation because it ranges across three states and is inhabited by more than
180,000 people in hundreds of distinct Indian communities, this federal
criminal justice regime spans more than one hundred Indian reservations
across the United States and involves thousands of federal cases opened
each year within "Indian country" as that term is defined by federal law.'
Thus, similar circumstances can be described for many other Indian tribes
and their reservations, such as the Jicarilla Apache in northern New Mexico,
the Hualapi who live adjacent to the Grand Canyon in Arizona, the Red
Lake Chippewa in northern Minnesota, or the various Chippewa and Potawatomi tribes in Michigan's upper peninsula.
Serious practical problems arise by virtue of the vast distances between
some Indian reservations and the federal courts that serve them. Consider,
for example, the challenge facing a victim or witness from the Red Lake
Band of Ojibwe Reservation near the Canadian border in northern Minnesota who may be required by federal summons to travel 250 miles or more
of back roads and highways to reach federal court in St. Paul or Minneapolis, Minnesota.6 While such distances would be daunting to anyone,
residents of Indian reservations (and certainly victims and witnesses to violent crime) tend to have incomes well below the poverty level.' It is fair to
assume that most reservation residents drive vehicles consistent with their
respective income levels. Indeed, the "Indian car" has become nearly as
http://lapahie.com/courts.cfm. Yet not one of the dozens of federal prosecutors who prosecute all of
the federal felonies from the Navajo reservation is a Navajo tribal member.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
transfer of a case to a district court division with a much lower percentage of American Indians did
not deprive defendant of a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community); United States v.
Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no evidence of discriminatory jury selection
in this case but noting in dicta that the systematic transfer of cases to district court divisions with
lower percentages of American Indians might result in the discriminatory exclusion of American
Indians); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that there were no
American Indians on the jury, although defendant failed to prove discrimination in the jury selection
system).
5.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).

6. The distance from the Red Lake Reservation to Minneapolis is approximately 250 miles
and might take nearly six hours even with good road conditions. Similarly, the Fort Peck Reservation is nearly 300 miles from the federal courts in either Great Falls or Billings, and both drives
could easily take six hours in good weather. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 657-62 (4th ed. 2004).

7.

Low income is correlated with a high rate of violent crime victimization for American
Indians. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
aic02.pdf; see also

LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS & CRIME 5 (1999), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/aic.pdf.

8. In 1999, 41.5% of the residents of the Navajo Nation, for example, had household incomes of less than $14,999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC
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fabled today9 as the Plains Indian pony was in the past, but for vastly different reasons.
In sum, a witness in an Indian country case may be facing a five-hour
or longer drive in an untrustworthy vehicle in a northern winter with nothing to look forward to but being forced to speak in public in front of a
large group of non-Indian strangers, or being forced to endure a painful

cross-examination in which her motives and perhaps her character will be
questioned.'0 Consider also the unfortunate federal prosecutor" or defense
attorney: a harried trial attorney working hard to marshal the evidence in a
criminal case while nervously looking out the window of the federal court-

house (at falling snow in Minneapolis in winter or the scorching desert
terrain in Arizona in the summer time) and desperately hoping that her
witnesses appear on time to testify.'"
As a result of a series of federal statutes, felony criminal justice is primarily a federal responsibility on hundreds of Indian reservations in the
Southeast, the Midwest, and throughout the western United States.'3 Though
the problems identified above are simple, practical obstacles to effective
CHARACTERISTICS: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION TRUST LAND 3 (2000),

available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/2502430.pdf. Likewise, 32.3% of residents of the
Fort Peck Reservation and 34.6% of residents of the Red Lake Reservation earned household incomes of less than $14,999 in 1999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: FORT PECK RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION
TRUST LAND 3 (2000), available at http://centstats.census.gov/data[US/2501250.pdf.
9.

The phrase "Indian car" has become a term of art in Indian country, and was immortal-

ized in a song by the same name by Bois Forte Chippewa recording artist Keith Secola and his Wild
Band of Indians. KEITH SECOLA AND THE WILD BAND OF INDIANS, Indian Car, on CIRCLE (Nor-

mal/Akina Records 1992). In the song, Secola describes the stereotypical Indian car: "My car is
dented, the radiator steams / Head light don't work, radio can scream /Got a sticker, says "Indian
power" / On my bumper, holds my car together." The 1999 Miramax film release Smoke Signals
features an Indian car that can only drive in reverse, derived from a Sherman Alexie story. SHERMAN
ALEXIE, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FISTFIGHT IN HEAVEN 156 (HarperPerennial 1994) (1993);
SMOKE SIGNALS (Miramax 1998). In sum, the Indian car is generally considered far less reliable
than the Indian pony of the nineteenth century.
10. American Indians age twelve and over are victims of rape and sexual assault at a rate
nearly four times that of all races (seven Indian victims per 1000, compared to two victims per 1000
for all races). GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 7, at 3.
11. As a practical matter, federal prosecutors in such cases rely heavily on victim/witness

coordinators, often tribal members themselves, who work in the United States Attorneys' Offices.
Victim/witness coordinators provide a host of duties to prosecutors and crime victims. One of the
most basic is to ensure that Indian victims and witnesses are provided transportation and accommodations so that they can appear for trial. The victim/witness coordinators are vital to the federal

prosecutors, and most cases that go to trial would not be successful without their hard work, their
careful logistical planning, and the supportive bond they form with the Indian victims and witnesses.
For a description of the role these employees play, see generally U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS
AND WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING YOUR RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/alm/LECC/VWRights.htm.

12. Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping in
Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.YU. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 99 (2001) ("[T]ravel time [in
federal Indian country cases] is often three or four hours or more. When witnesses have to travel far
to give testimony, they sometimes do not show up.").
13. On some reservations in so-called Public Law 280 states, this responsibility is a state and
local one. See generally Carol E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
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criminal justice, they may represent problems that are far more serious. In
the United States, criminal justice is an inherently local activity as a matter
of constitutional design; American criminal justice systems are carefully
designed to empower local communities to solve internal problems and to
restore peace and harmony in the community. Viewed in this light, many of
the practical problems outlined above, and more serious ones discussed below, may represent violations of fundamental constitutional norms. In short,
federal justice in Indian country simply may not accord with many of the
basic legal principles that guide American courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials.
Consider some of the most obvious questions raised by a federal Indian
country prosecution: Does an Indian defendant receive a trial by a jury of
his peers when he faces a federal jury in a distant city composed of nonIndians who are foreign to the Indian community, who may very well speak
a different language and who are subject to a different set of laws and a different process for adjudicating them? Does an Indian community have a
voice in issues of public safety when its local felonies are prosecuted, defended, and adjudicated in distant and foreign tribunals by federal officials
who are not accountable to tribal leaders or the community? Are basic requirements of fairness and due process met when defendants, crime victims,
and witnesses are summoned to court hundreds of miles away to testify
about simple but serious local crimes that occurred in their own backyards?
Can a community enjoy its right to a "public trial" when a local crime is
adjudicated in a non-televised trial hundreds of miles away in a city that is
difficult to reach from the reservation? As these questions suggest,' 4 the federal Indian country criminal justice scheme is subject to a host of criticisms
derived from implicit constitutional values of federalism and localism and
explicit constitutional requirements of criminal procedure.
Among the chief sources of criticism of the federal Indian country
criminal justice system is the prevalence of crime against Indians.15 Indians
are far more likely than members of all other major racial classes to be victims
of violent crime. An American Indian or Alaska Native is two-and-a-half
times more likely than a member of the general public to be a victim of violent crime and twice as likely as an African American.16 From 1992 through
2001, the average annual rate of violent victimizations among Indians was

14. This list of questions leaves out a host of equal protection questions potentially raised by
prosecutions in Indian country, such as disparities between federal and state sentences for identical
offenses based on the racial identities of the perpetrators and victims. The Supreme Court has generally indicated that equal protection claims premised on race are not salient in Indian law given the
unique political status of Indians and Indian tribes recognized in the Constitution. See United States
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
15.

For an extensive review of then-existing research in involving Indians and crime, see
(1999). Lester challenges research studies asserting that Indians commit crime more than other minority groups, but does not address the
assertions that Indians are victimized at higher rates. See generally also RONET BACHMAN, DEATH
AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVATION (1992).
DAVID LESTER, CRIME AND THE NATIVE AMERICAN

16.

PERRY, supra

note 7 at 5-6.
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101 per 1,000 residents twelve years of age and older. 7 This compares to
fifty violent victimizations per 1,000 blacks, forty-one per 1,000 whites and
twenty-two per 1,000 Asians. 8 Sexual offenses against women and children
are especially serious problems in Indian country.' 9

In discussing the high crime rates on Indian reservations, academics
fault federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents who are accused of
declining meritorious prosecutions, particularly of non-Indian offenders.
Congress has found fault too, but has treated the issue as a resource allocation problem. In recent years, Congress has dramatically increased funding
and positions for federal prosecutors and FBI agents who work these
cases. But the problems that exist in Indian country criminal justice may
be far deeper than a lack of enthusiasm by federal prosecutors or an insufficient number of federal prosecutors and investigators to perform the
tasks. It may stem from structural problems in the system.
For thirty-five years, federal policymakers have moved more and more
decisively in the context of Indian law and policy toward an approach that
fosters "tribal self-determination" and have sought to restore the powers of
tribal governments. As a result of the advance of federal Indian policy, the
federal criminal justice system in Indian country no longer rests comfortably
within the mainstream of federal Indian policy. To some degree it seems to
be a relic, perhaps, of colonialism. While the notion of community "selfdetermination" has been enthusiastically embraced only fairly recently in
federal Indian policy, it is a long-standing and hallowed norm in American
criminal justice. Indeed, many of the key institutions of the federal criminal
justice system, such as juries, were designed to assure community control of
criminal justice. Given that American criminal justice is designed in many
respects to build in "self-determination" as its own guiding principle, it is
perhaps ironic that criminal justice in Indian country has been resistant to
such notions.
Thus, rather than challenging the existing system on the grounds that it
is inconsistent with federal Indian policy, this Article instead asks a more
fundamental question: is this federal criminal justice system consistent
with its own prevailing norms? In other words, this Article evaluates the
federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian
law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically,
this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart
of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy
of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical description of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice
system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institutional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the
17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT ON THE
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 21-23 (2000),

PREVALENCE,

available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/183781 .pdf.
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handicaps faced by federal prosecutors in Indian country prosecutions and
questions whether prosecutorial discretion can be exercised appropriately
when "outsiders" prosecute local crimes in Indian country. Part III focuses
on another key institution in criminal justice, the jury. It describes the role
that juries serve in American criminal justice and explains why federal
juries in Indian country cases cannot perform some of these functions,
leaving them inadequate under the Sixth Amendment. Part IV turns to the
somewhat related topics of venue and the right to a public trial, examining
whether the existing Major Crimes Act system is consistent with prevailing First Amendment values of public access and general constitutional
principles of venue and vicinage in criminal cases.
I.

THE MODERN STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE

A brief introduction to the current contours of criminal justice in Indian
country, and a critical description of the process from the viewpoint of the
Indian community is helpful to understanding the complex problems that the
system must address.
A. A Legal Descriptionof the Indian Country Regime
The federal Indian country criminal justice regime consists primarily
of a trio of federal laws that create a complex jurisdictional framework. 20
The first of the three statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which defines no offenses but merely sets forth the geographic scope of federal Indian country
jurisdiction. Literally defining the term "Indian country," § 1151 demarcates federal jurisdiction as extending to all lands within Indian
reservations as well as so-called "dependent Indian communities" and allotments to which the Indian titles have not been extinguished.2' While
interpretation of the statute is relatively straightforward, recent cases have
imposed a distinct judicial gloss that has both expanded and narrowed the
scope of the plain language in significant ways. For example, the Tenth
Circuit has held that Indian country includes some federal trust lands that
20.

The entire scheme is set out in much greater detail in Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Juris-

diction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503 (1976).

The United States Code defines a handful of other offenses related to highly specific subjects, such
as intoxicating liquors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56 (2000), gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000), and
unauthorized hunting, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2000), but these offenses are rarely prosecuted.
21.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian country",
as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
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do not otherwise fit neatly within the three categories set forth in the statute. 2 In contrast, the Supreme Court has so narrowly defined the second
category, "dependent Indian communities," that the phrase would no
longer seem to apply to those communities that originally gave the phrase
21
its meaning.
The other two key statutes are the Major Crimes Act, set forth at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 and another statute known variously as the Indian Country
Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act 24 (the latter will be used here, in
contradistinction to "Major Crimes Act"). The General Crimes Act provides that the general federal laws enacted to apply to locations within
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, also known generally as
the federal enclaves laws, apply in Indian country. One of the federal enclaves laws, the Assimilative Crimes Act,21 provides that any state criminal
law of the state in which the lands are located can be assimilated if there is
no federal criminal law on point. Because of this provision, the General
Crimes Act allows a federal prosecution for virtually any conceivable offense, whether misdemeanor or felony.
While the General Crimes Act appears tremendously broad, it has
some limitations. First, as a matter of federalism, federal courts have held
that the law may not be used to prosecute a crime in which no Indians are
26
involved. As a result, the General Crimes Act may be used to prosecute a
non-Indian only if the non-Indian has committed a crime against an Indian. Second, the General Crimes Act explicitly excludes offenses by one
Indian against another. Thus, a prosecution against an Indian under the
General Crimes Act is available only if the Indian commits a crime against
a non-Indian. The General Crimes Act existed before the Major Crimes

22. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 n.2 (1995) (using term
"informal reservation"); United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1129-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (declaring that Indian Country jurisdiction extends over tribal lands held in trust by the federal government,
even though such land is not within an Indian reservation, is not an allotment, and does not technically meet the definition of "dependent Indian community").
23. Compare Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), with
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See also Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999) (criticizing the
Venetie decision's narrow interpretation of the term).
24.

Section 1152 declares:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has
been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
25.

18 U.S.C. § 13(2000).

26. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (providing that if a non-Indian
commits a crime against another non-Indian, then the state has exclusive jurisdiction because there
is no federal interest in the case).
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Act and originally arose as a way to address conflict between Indians and
settlers and to federalize protection of each against one another."
The Major Crimes Act addressed this second limitation. As a matter of
respect for the sovereignty of Indian tribes, Congress never applied the
General Crimes Act to offenses between Indians. In the Major Crimes
Act, however, Congress gave federal prosecutors authority to prosecute
certain "major" crimes by Indians against Indians or others. The Major
Crimes Act thus intruded into an area of exclusive tribal sovereignty and
made federal law enforcement officers the primary agents for adjudicating
serious crimes on Indian reservations.
Viewed together, the Indian country definition, the Major Crimes Act,
and the General Crimes Act constitute the jurisdictional apparatus for
bringing criminal cases in Indian country into federal court. None of these
laws, however, provides the substantive offenses to which they refer. The
substantive definitions must be found elsewhere in the criminal code and,
if the Assimilative Crimes Act is used, in state law. This means, of course,
that the serious crimes in Indian country are defined by federal and state
officials, not by tribal officials.
Complementing this trio of federal statutes is the Indian Civil Rights
Act. That Act strips tribes of jurisdiction over crimes punished by sentences greater than one year of imprisonment or a fine of more than
$5000.29 As a result, tribes may define and prosecute any offense, but because of the sentencing limitation, tribal offenses would be labeled
federally as misdemeanors. As a result, though many tribes have active
criminal court dockets, only the federal government-and not tribes-can
address serious crimes with felony sentences. The Indian Civil Rights Act
thus has the effect of elevating the importance of the federal criminal justice regime in Indian country and giving it primacy.

27.

See Clinton, supra note 20, at 537.

28. Thus, while most of the Indian law and policy criticisms of the Major Crimes Act set
forth above do not apply to prosecutions under the General Crimes Act, many of the criticisms from
the standpoint of constitutional criminal procedure set forth below will apply.
29.

25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
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B. A Practical,CriticalDescriptionof the Process
of an Indian Country Case °
The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over all the crimes listed in the

Major Crimes Act.3' However, Indian country cases differ in several respects
from most other crimes investigated by the FBI. First, the cases are almost
always reactive. That is, a crime occurs and is then investigated by federal
law enforcement. In most cases, it is a singular event and not part of an on-

going criminal enterprise. Few proactive investigations occur in Indian
country. As a result, few sophisticated law enforcement tools are used at the
field level in Indian country. It is exceedingly rare, for example, for Indian
country FBI agents to employ wiretaps, to execute trap and trace or pen reg-

ister subpoenas on phone companies, or to work with informants who have
infiltrated a criminal organization. Indeed, undercover operations are espe-

cially rare, partially because of the great difficulty outsiders have infiltrating
criminal organizations in Indian communities. With the exception of an occasional polygraph exam or DNA or fingerprint analysis, Indian country
cases call on few of the specialized skills of the FBI.

Second, though the offenses are "major" and often tremendously important in the communities where these crimes occur, almost all of the crimes
are routine, local and simple cases involving violent crimes that, in another
context, would be characterized as "common street crimes" and that would
not be investigated by federal officials but for the Indian country nexus.

Given the FBI's many other responsibilities, such as counterintelligence,
terrorism prevention, and the investigation of other serious offenses, such as

organized crime and complex narcotics conspiracies, Indian country crimes
rarely rank high among the FBI's priorities. As a result, the moniker "major"
is somewhat misleading as an expression of FBI interest and prioritization.
The routine and unsophisticated character of these cases has ramifications at both the organizational and the individual level. At the
organizational level, few FBI agents are assigned to Indian country investigations. In contrast to the team approach that prevails in many FBI
30. The authority for this section of the Article, except where otherwise noted, is the author's
own admittedly subjective viewpoint derived from his experience as a federal prosecutor in an Indian country district and from conversations with other former and current Indian country federal
prosecutors, such as Norman Bay (D.N.M.), Kathleen Bliss (D. Nev.), Chris Chaney (D. Utah), Jeff
Davis (W.D. Mich.), Jonathon Gerson (D.N.M.), Tom Heffelfinger (D. Minn), Diane Humetewa (D.
Ariz.), Joseph Lodge (D. Ariz.), Arvo Mikkanen. (W.D. Okla.), Cliff Wardlaw (D. Minn.), and Sam
Winder (D.N.M.). It also reflects impressions gained from several federal public defenders, such as
John Butcher (D.N.M.), Vito De La Cruz (D. Nev.), Michael Keefe (D.N.M.), John Rhodes (D.
Mont.), and Jon Sands (D. Ariz.). Finally, this section also reflects my impressions gained from
conversations with several FBI agents, such as Special Agent Frank Chimits. While facts were
gleaned from my own experience and each of these conversations, some of the officials named
above would disagree strongly with the conclusions I have drawn. I imply no endorsement.
31.

See U.S.

9, CRIMINAL
§§ 675-76, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading-rooml
usam/title9/download.htm [hereinafter U.S. Arr'Ys' MANUAL] (setting forth authority for federal
law enforcement in Indian country within Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs and the United States Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation in November 1993).
RESOURCE MANUAL

DEP'T OF JUSTIC, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: TITLE
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investigations, the agent handling Indian country investigations often works
hundreds of miles of reservation roads
alone in rural settings and may travel
32
in the course of a week's work. Because of the high caseload that each
agent bears, agents often work together only when crucial to personal
safety.33 As a result, the individual FBI agent may find such work lonely,
dull, or, given the subject matter, even unpleasant. To the extent that an

agent does work with another person, it is often a tribal officer.
Most Indian country agents work out of small offices called "resident
agencies" or "RAs" which are often staffed with just two or three other
35
agents in small cities bordering or near Indian reservations. An agent
posted at an RA may not have signed up to the FBI expecting to be posted to
such an out-of-the-way location or to be handling the kind of cases that fill
the caseload of the average Indian country special agent, such as sexual
abuse of children. Because Indian country tends not to be a prestigious post-

ing, the agents in the RAs are often rookies or "first office agents" who seek
transfer as soon as they are eligible, leading to sometimes high turnover
among the FBI personnel dealing with Indian country offenses.36
The law enforcement arm of the Bureau of Indian Affairs also possesses
investigative jurisdiction over Indian country offenses. 37 Because of the
overlap in investigative jurisdiction with the FBI, BIA patrol officers and
criminal investigators generally handle offenses of less serious magnitude
than the ones handled by the FBI. One key difference between the FBI and
the BIA is that the federal policy of tribal self-governance has taken hold
within the BIA law enforcement program. Through agreements with the
Department of the Interior known as "638 contracts" and "self-governance
32. Over the years, the FBI has begun several initiatives with local tribal law enforcement
agencies to address some of these problems. The current initiative is called the "Safe Trails Task
Forces." Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Indian Country Crime (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/cid/indian/safetrails.htm.
33. This is obvious from FBI statistics. In the calendar year 2004, approximately 100 FBI
agents worked on Indian country cases nationwide. Collectively, they instituted numerous investigations culminating in approximately 1900 cases. See Grant D. Ashley, Executive Assistant Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the National Native American Law Enforcement Association's
12th Annual Training Conference (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/ashley 102804.htm.
34. Violent crimes investigations sometimes involve blood spatter, collection of semen, and
other "blood and guts type" evidence, or, even worse, difficult social and emotional issues, such as
sex crimes against children.
35. For example, Indian country RAs are located in Flagstaff and Pinetop, Arizona; Bemidji,
Minnesota; Gallup and Farmington, New Mexico; and Vernal and Monticello, Utah, among other
cities. See, e.g., Phoenix Division Regional Offices, http://phoenix.fbi.gov/pxterrit.htm (last visited
Dec. 17, 2005) (listing RAs in the Arizona area).
36. According to federal law enforcement lore, Indian country RAs once served a punitive
role as places to exile FBI agents that fouled up important cases or were otherwise the subject of
disfavor within the Bureau. See infra note 30.
See 25 U.S.C. § 2803 (2000) (BIA law enforcement authority); see also U.S. ATT'Ys'
supra note 31, §§ 675-76 (including a memorandum of understanding between the United
States Departments of Justice and Interior reaching agreement that each United States Attorney will
prepare local guidelines indicating which law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction and that
jurisdictional disputes will be resolved, if possible, at the field level).
37.

MANUAL
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compacts, 3 s many tribal governments have undertaken the BIA's law enforcement and investigative responsibilities on their reservations. In
undertaking this responsibility under federal law, a tribal government effectively substitutes its own tribal police for BIA law enforcement (just as BIA
law enforcement once supplanted tribal law enforcement institutions).3 9

Since investigation precedes a criminal prosecution, the "devolution" to
tribes of this important function can give tribal law enforcement a key role
in criminal cases. As a result, in some cases involving less serious felony
offenses, tribal police will work directly with federal prosecutors.
Because authority for investigation of such crimes overlaps between independent law enforcement agencies, jurisdictional disputes can develop. °
Often, uniformed BIA or tribal police arrive on the scene first. The overlap
in the jurisdictional roles of the FBI and BIA, while sometimes leading to

conflict, has some advantages to the community in that one agency can investigate even if another declines to do so. 41
Because alcohol is involved in a substantial number of the crimes in Indian country, 42 many cases are not difficult to solve. Suspects rarely employ
sophisticated strategies for covering their tracks. Often the perpetrator is
known and the most difficult challenge is to locate him and make an arrest.
On rural parts of reservations that are accessed by dirt roads without street
signs or visible addresses on the homes, however, effective investigation
38. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(1) (Supp. V 1975) and 25 C.F.R. § 271 (1996). Although neither
BIA officials nor the tribes were particularly happy with practical implementation of the 638 contract program, the regime was hampered by the Byzantine bureaucracy of the BIA, which
compartmentalized functions in a manner that frustrated flexibility among those providing services.
See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalismto
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1264-66 (1995).
39. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f) (2000) (recognizing that tribal law enforcement officers
possess the status of federal officers for certain purposes when working under a 638 contract for law
enforcement); see also WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 20-21 (1966) (describing
various traditional tribal law enforcement institutions such as the Cherokee Lighthorsemen).
40.

HAGAN, supra note 39, at 20-22.

41.
Investigative decisions by Tribal or BIA law enforcement officials not to investigate or
not to refer a case for prosecution are not decisive because the FBI may independently investigate
and make its own referral if it deems appropriate. See U.S. ATT'YS' MANUAL, supra note 31,
§§ 675-76 (including memorandum indicating that tribal or Interior law enforcement must notify
the FBI of any decision to decline to investigate a criminal matter falling within the investigative
authority of either agency). Likewise, investigative decisions by tribal law enforcement officials to
investigate and refer a case are reviewed by a United States Attorney who can, of course, decline to
prosecute. Id.
42. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from Two
Young Lives in Indian Country, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2145, 2154 (2005) (noting "oppressive
force of alcohol in the Native community"); Kathy Helms, Navajo Nation No.1 in Crime, INDEP.
(Gallup, N.M.), Nov. 1, 2004, at 2 (quoting Assistant United States Attorney Diane Humetewa,
"Ninety-nine percent of the cases referred to [the Arizona United States Attorney's Office] involve
alcohol or substance abuse...."); see also LAWRENCE PIERSOL ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 35 (2003), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/
NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf ("Across the board, alcohol plays a significant role in all violent crime
arising in Indian country."); STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 19 (2001) (noting that alcohol-related crime is the leading crime
problem in Indian country and explaining the repeated citation of alcohol abuse as a challenge facing Indian policing and Indian communities in general).
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may require significant local knowledge of homes and other locations. It
may also require some knowledge of family ties and social networks in the
community. Because Indian communities are often relatively closed to
strangers, federal law enforcement officers such as FBI agents face a significant handicap and often find themselves at the mercy of tribal officers.
Indeed, a tribal police officer that lives in a community is almost certain to
have stronger contacts and may very well be able to produce information in
an investigation that a federal agent would never discover. As a result, federal agents often develop close working relationships with tribal officers.
After the arrest, federal officers are likely to extract a confession. Confessions seem far more common in federal Indian country cases than in
other federal cases, such as narcotics cases. While the relative lack of sophistication of the criminal defendant and the strength of the evidence may
occasionally work to help the FBI agent extract a confession, at least one
commentator has speculated that the tribal values of honesty and of being
forthright in accepting responsibility for one's actions that disrupted the
community may also play a role.43
Once the perpetrator is found (sometimes in tribal custody), federal
agents must make the arrest (or take custody) and take the perpetrator before
a United States Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. Because the
cases tend to be reactive, it is often at the time of the arrest, or only shortly
before, that the United States Attorney's Office first learns of the offense.
The first substantive prosecutorial step in a federal major crimes case is
review of the evidence and the determination of whether or not to pursue a
prosecution. Following the arrest, federal prosecutors work with the arresting officer to prepare a criminal complaint or else direct that the perpetrator
be released. If the United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") decides to proceed, it will file a criminal complaint. The perpetrator will then be taken to
the nearest federal court for an initial appearance. During that appearance,
the federal prosecutor may file a motion for a detention hearing.44 If so, the
defendant is "bound over" and remains in custody pending the hearing.
If the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed to represent
him in later proceedings. A substantial number of Indian country defendants
are indigent and are represented by the Federal Public Defender or, if that
office is unavailable or has a conflict, an attorney selected by the court from
a panel of attorneys on a court-approved list of criminal defense attorneys
who are willing to take cases under the court's modest fee structure.
The defense attorney will face several obstacles that may make it difficult to provide effective representation. At the outset, the defense attorney

43. Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2156 ("[T]here is a socialization to accountability that operates in indigenous societies that is not necessarily compatible with the underlying principles of
American criminal law .... ).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). A handful of federal districts with substantial Indian reservation lands have part-time magistrate judges who sit in smaller cities close to Indian reservations who
serve no other purpose but to preside over initial appearances so that a perpetrator may be bound
over for a detention hearing.
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may need an interpreter to communicate with the defendant 5 and may face
significant cultural hurdles in developing a trusting relationship. With limited resources, the defense attorney may have difficulty investigating a crime
that occurred a great distance from the court (and the defender's urban office). Hours of investigative work may be consumed in traveling to and from
the reservation to search for and interview witnesses. The defense team may
not have the resources to send an investigator on numerous trips to the reservation. In this respect, there may be striking asymmetry between the
prosecutors who use agents relatively close to the reservation and defense
attorneys who lack "resident agency" offices for their investigators.
Once a defendant has been charged, and following the initial appearance, a defendant commonly appears before a United States Magistrate
Judge for an arraignment and, if the United States seeks to hold the defendant in custody pending trial, a detention hearing. 46 At these preliminary
stages, the court fills two primary roles. The court identifies the charges that
the defendant faces and formally advises the defendant of his key procedural
rights. The second role is risk assessment: the court must measure the likelihood that the defendant will flee or otherwise fail to appear at future
proceedings, and determine whether release of the47 defendant "will endanger
the safety of any other person or the community."
The magistrate judge who must make these evaluations is almost certain
to be a non-Indian who lacks any particular familiarity with the Indian
community where the defendant was arrested. Moreover, if the court lies at
a great distance from the community where the crime occurred, it may be
difficult for the defendant and his attorney to locate and present witnesses
who can assist the defendant in contesting detention. Often a defendant will
meet his attorney only a short time before the arraignment and detention
hearing. Even outside Indian country, such hearings often occur with imperfect and incomplete information. In the Indian country context, reliable
information and witnesses are likely to be even more difficult to obtain.
In the federal system, no felony prosecution, including those for major
crimes in Indian country, may proceed without an indictment issued by a
grand jury.4s Thus, whether or not the defendant is held in detention, the

45. Federal courts certify Navajo interpreters. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 201 n.255 (2001). However, some tribal courts routinely proceed in
their own native languages, other than Navajo, such as Lakota. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM,
BRAID OF FEATHERS 69-70 (1995). This suggests that some federal Indian defendants other than
Navajos might also benefit from official interpreters.
46.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000);

47.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2000).

FED.

R. CRiM. P. 5(a).

48. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to an indictment: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger .... U.S. CoNST. amend. V. This guarantee is incorporated into Rule
6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the method for constituting a grand
jury and applicable rules, such as the rule of secrecy. FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(3)(1). However, a criminal
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United States Attorney must next present an indictment to the grand jury or
risk having the case dismissed. 49 A federal grand jury consists of up to
twenty-three citizens selected randomly to serve for a lengthy term-often
one year, though a longer time is authorized. ° Grand jurors screen and
evaluate prosecutorial charging decisions by ensuring that the evidence presented by the prosecutor is sufficient to meet a legal standard of probable

cause. Though the American criminal justice system uses a grand jury for
this function primarily to ensure that the community has a role in the ad-

ministration of criminal justice, few or none of the grand jurors in most
Indian country cases actually reside in any Indian country community.5 '
As an empirical matter, grand juries usually issue the indictments that
federal prosecutors seek.52 Once the indictment is issued, the defendant will
be arraigned again on the indictment. The defendant, in consultation with

his attorney and in negotiations with federal prosecutors, will decide
whether to plead guilty or go to trial. If the defendant chooses to go to trial,
witnesses must be found and served with subpoenas; they will be required to
travel to federal court to testify and may be required to wait around a day or
two to testify, depending on the pace of the trial.
For reasons that will be addressed fully below,53 the venire from which

the jury is selected is unlikely to have a single member of the Indian community in which the crime occurred. At trial, neither the prosecutor, the

defense attorney, the marshals, nor the court security officers, the court reporter, the judge, or law clerks are likely to live within the community
where the offense occurred. In many cases, the only other tribal member in
the courtroom will be the interpreter,5 if one is needed, and the witnesses. In

defendant who cooperates may waive indictment and allow the United States to proceed on the basis
of an information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
49.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 48(b).

50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a), (g). The federal grand jury in districts with large numbers of major
crimes prosecutions typically meets for one to three days on a monthly or semiweekly basis.
51.

For a discussion of Indian representation on juries, see infra Section IH.B-C.

52. Lawyers and scholars tend to be skeptical of the importance of the modem grand jury's
screening power. Many believe that grand jury review represents, at best, "a modest screening
power, a fact recognized by the familiar courthouse saying that a grand jury would indict a ham
sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to do so." Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 51 n.70 (2002) (citing R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a
More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 361, 361 (2000)).
53.

See infra Section I1I.B--C.

54. See Christopher Chaney, Victim Rights in Indian Country-An Assistant United States
Attorney Perspective, U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL., Jan. 2003 at 36 (noting use of a Navajo/English language
translator for a nineteen-year-old witness in a typical, though fictional, case). The courts largely
need interpreters not for the witnesses and the defendant, but for the judge, the jury, the prosecutor,
the defender, and for purposes of creating a written record. In other words, the interpreter is needed
for reasons external to the community and precisely because the community's language is not adequate for purposes of the federal court. The need for a translator is thus emblematic of the colonial
nature of the system; it is designed to inflict an external justice system on communities that have
existed in the same locale since before English was spoken.
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that sense, the tribunal may seem alien to the defendant, and he may not feel
that he is being judged in any sense by his own community.
If the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted at trial, he will proceed to

sentencing before a federal judge. The federal judge generally will not be
accustomed to seeing the kind of offenses at issue in the case, except in Indian country cases. Because he has little experience with similar offenses
that occur outside the reservation and are thus handled routinely in state
courts, the judge may well have a skewed view of the Indian community
where the crime occurred.
At sentencing, the defendant will be sentenced in accordance with the
federal sentencing guidelines and other federal laws, including mandatory

minimum sentences for certain crimes. As a practical matter, neither Congress
nor the U.S. Sentencing Commission have considered the particular effect of
the sentences on Indian communities or Indian country defendants." As a
result, the sentences may well be substantially longer than the average sen-

tence for a similar offense in state court. 6 Moreover, though the defendant's
criminal record in federal or state courts will be used to calculate his crimi-

nal history for purposes of calculating the length of his sentence, federal
courts usually ignore the defendant's criminal records from tribal courts 7
Once the sentence is pronounced, the federal Bureau of Prisons will assign the defendant to a particular prison. The prison is likely to be located in
a different state than where the offense occurred. s This greater relative distance is likely to make it much more difficult for the defendant's children
and other family members to visit him, a problem exacerbated by the pre-

vailing poverty among Indian families. The defendant thus may become
alienated from his family and deprived of emotional support that otherwise

might have helped him survive incarceration and achieve some measure of
rehabilitation.

55. PIERSOL, supra note 42; see also Native Am. Advisory Group, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Transcript of Public Hearing at the Judicial Conference Center (Nov. 4, 2003),
http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NAAGhear.pdf [hereinafter Transcript].
56. See Transcript, supra note 55. The amount of the disparity depends, of course, on the
state in which the offense occurred.
57. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and FederalSentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,
414-17 (2004); see also Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of Tribal
Courts, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 209, 209 (2005); Jon M. Sands & Jane McClellan, Commentary, Policy Meets Practice: Why Tribal Convictions Should not be Counted, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 215
(2005); Bruce D. Black, Commentary on Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of Tribal
Courts, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 218 (2005); William C. Canby, Jr., Commentary, Treatment of Tribal
Court Convictions, 17 FED. SENT'O REP. 220 (2005); Charles Kommann, Commentary on Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 222 (2005).
58. The problem is exacerbated by Federal Bureau of Prisons policy. For more than a decade, the only substantial sex offender treatment program within the federal prisons was in Butner,
North Carolina, which is more than 1700 miles from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and more than
1800 miles from Rapid City, South Dakota. As a result, federal defendants had to make an unfortunate choice between living near family and obtaining treatment. See MAGDELINE JENSEN ET AL.,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SEXUAL OFFENSES SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING
AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (2003) (on file with author).
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II.

FEDERAL PROSECUTORS IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Because the prosecutor is, in many respects, the single most important
actor in a federal Indian country case, 9 an examination of the role of the
prosecutor is a useful place to begin a critical examination of federal Indian
country prosecutions. The prosecution and imprisonment of an Indian for an
on-reservation crime against another Indian is perhaps the single most aggressive use of federal power against an Indian that routinely occurs, at least
in modem times, and thus may be one of the greatest existing intrusions on
internal tribal affairs. I will address three different types of problems created

by the use of federal prosecutors in Indian country. The first set of problems
relates to the intersection between community values, prosecutorial discre-

tion, and prosecutorial accountability. The second major problem is a
practical political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry effect."
And, finally, the third is a tribal governance issue that stems partially from

the previous problems.
A. Community Values and the Foundationof ProsecutorialDiscretion
and ProsecutorialAccountability

In the American criminal justice system, the prosecutor "is the representative of the public in whom is lodged a discretion" to review the evidence
and determine whether or not to bring criminal charges. 60 In the United
' 6

States, the power of prosecutors is routinely characterized as "tremendous
. -. ,,62
and the prosecutor's discretion is described as "virtually unlimited.
Prosecutorial discretion begins with the decision to charge the defendant, a most
important power, but it actually extends to numerous decisions made
throughout a federal case, such as which charges to include, whether to seek
to have the defendant held in custody pending trial, whether to offer alternative sanctions such as pretrial diversion, whether to accept a guilty plea to

59. Mandatory minimum sentences and the overwhelming prevalence of plea bargains have
arguably made federal prosecutors more powerful than judges; once the prosecutor decides which
offense to charge, the prosecutor has, in effect, locked in a very narrow range of discretion for the
judge in deciding the sentence. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO.L.
REV. 723 (1993). While a jury could conceivably exercise discretion over the prosecutor's charging
decision by, for example, convicting on a lesser-included offense, juries are not informed about
mandatory minimum sentences or about the power of nullification. Moreover, juries are absent in
the overwhelming majority of cases that are resolved through plea bargains. See Stephanos Bibas,
Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097,
1149-50 (2001) (noting that only 4% of adjudicated felons have jury trials, and 5% have bench
trials, while 91% plea bargain).
60. United States v. Cox, 342 F2d 167, 192 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. 11. 1945)).
61.
(1940).

Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 18, 18-19

62. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521,
1525 (1981); see also James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials,
1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 678 ("The prosecutor's decision whether and what to charge is the broadest
discretionary power in criminal [justice] administration.").
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less than all of the offenses charged, and whether to seek sentencing enhancements.63

While the decision to prosecute for a specific offense is reviewable, to
some degree, by the grand jury,64 decisions not to bring a case or to "undercharge" are entirely unreviewable. 6' As Kenneth Culp Davis has recognized,

"the affirmative power to prosecute is enormous, but the negative power to
withhold prosecution may be even greater, because it is less protected

against abuse." 66
As a practical matter, it is incorrect to say that federal prosecutorial discretion is entirely unbounded. Federal prosecutors are guided both by
general and specific directions set forth in the United States Attorney's
Manual, 67 which apply nationwide. Federal prosecutors generally also pos68
sess district-specific guidelines, written and unwritten,
that inform
69
decisions about which cases to prosecute. The local prosecutorial guide-

lines, which describe threshold facts that must exist to warrant consideration
of the case for prosecution, are routinely shared with law enforcement agencies to assist agents in determining how to prioritize their investigations.7 °
Those United States Attorneys with Indian country criminal jurisdiction often spell out specific guidelines for the offenses enumerated in the Major
Crimes Act. These local guidelines are generally not binding; they exist entirely as a matter of discretion and therefore need not be strictly followed by
the prosecutors who rely on them. It is thus unclear how much effect the
federal prosecutorial guidelines have on prosecutorial behavior.

63.

See, e.g., Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Low Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L.

REV.

427, 428 (1960).
64.

See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the grand jury).

65. See William T. Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorialDiscretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325,
1337 (1993); see also Patrick Halligan, A Political Economy of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 5 Am. J.
CRIM. L. 2, 6 (1977) (noting that the discretion to prosecute is limited to some degree by equal protection guarantees, but that the discretion not to prosecute is limitless).
66.

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

188 (1969).

67. U.S. ATr'Ys' MANUAL, supra note 31, §§ 675-76; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837; Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:A Case Study in Controlling Federalization,75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 893, 934-36 (2000).

68. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges:A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980).
69. U.S. ATT'Ys'
Federal Prosecution).

MANUAL,

supra note 31, § 9-27.230(B)(1) (setting forth the Principles of

70. For example, the United States Attorney's Prosecutive Guidelines for the District of New
Mexico in force in 1997 provided that it would "accept any prosecutable cases which affect interstate commerce and which involve death or serious bodily injury. In all other cases there must be a
provable interstate commerce nexus and the property damage must be over $10,000." Memorandum
from U.S. Att'y to Special Agent in Charge, Regarding Prosecutive Guidelines for Matters Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States Attorney's Office, District of New Mexico 3 (Apr. 18, 1997) (on
file with author). This guideline for arson is not unusual in that it leaves a large gray area; it does not
necessarily indicate that the office will accept prosecution of cases involving greater than a $10,000
loss that do not involve a dwelling or danger to human life. Id.
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Even where prosecutors purport to be following objective guidelines,
they nevertheless have tremendous latitude because they must also make an
independent and highly subjective judgment about the sufficiency of evidence to bring a case. In other words, even where the alleged facts clearly

meet the guidelines, a prosecutor may well decide that the alleged facts cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such decisions are notoriously
difficult to second-guess, and no other institutional actor has constitutional
standing to do so."

The tremendous breadth of prosecutorial discretion has been justified on
a number of grounds. First, courts
S• 72 have regularly noted the practical difficulty in reviewing such decisions. Such decisions are based on all sorts of
reasons, such as allocation of prosecutorial and investigative resources, law
enforcement priorities, and subjective assessments of evidence and guilt.

And few of these reasons are set forth in a written record that make them
amenable to judicial review. Second, there are strong institutional concerns
for preserving separation of powers between the judicial and executive
branches of government. 3 Third, prosecutors must retain broad discretion in
a world in which they simply cannot enforce all of the criminal laws on the

books.74 In addition to these practical justifications, broad prosecutorial discretion has been normatively justified by the premise that prosecutors take

into account and indeed internalize the community's values and mores in
determining which cases to prosecute. In other words, we trust prosecutors
with broad power precisely because we expect them to exercise that power
in a manner consistent with the needs of the community. Indeed, in the
American system, in which many prosecutors announce their appearance in
court by claiming that they represent "the people," the prosecutor is imbued

with an almost moral authority that transcends mere governmental power.75
71.
See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that
the prosecutor must consider "[mlyriad factors" and "no court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or
review his decision").
72. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[Blroad discretion rests
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute [is based on a variety of factors and] is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.").
73.

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).

74. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 192-93 (recognizing the nearly universal view that the prosecuting power intrinsically involves broad discretion because not all laws can be enforced, prosecution
involves interpretation of statutes that are inherently uncertain, and the prosecutor must exercise
discretion in determining whether evidence is sufficient); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note
67, at 899 n.206 ("[Riesource constraints prevent universal prosecution and incarceration of all ...
who technically ... violate[] the law.").
75. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), provides the most well-known expression of this moral authority:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
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This moral and legal authority to act on behalf of the community is reinforced by the fact that most prosecutors are local officials entrusted by the
community to perform this important function. 76 The premise that the prosecutor acts with community values in mind is supported, in most non-federal
American jurisdictions, by strong political checks on prosecutorial abuses 7
The chief prosecutor in most American jurisdictions is elected. Public accountability arises from the notion that "prosecutors are ... likely to satisfy

the public's desires if their decisions have some implications for their careers."7 8 The political checks include direct control through election of
prosecutors (or those who appoint them), to serve limited terms (in contrast
to, for example, federal judges who have life tenure), and indirect control
through appropriations and other legislative decisions.79 It also presumably
includes indirect and'informal checks such as media attention and popular
opinion.
Even in the federal system, where prosecutors are appointed by the
80
President and thus are insulated to a greater degree from electoral politics,
the basic organizational scheme nevertheless reflects a preference for local
control and the notion that a local prosecutor can better reflect local community values. Then-Attorney General, later Justice, Robert Jackson
recognized that even federal prosecutors should be responsive to community
values and sentiments when he recognized that "the moral climate of the
United States is as varied as its physical climate," and thus even federal
prosecutors "could hardly adopt strict standards for loose states or loose
standards for strict states without doing violence to local sentiment."'" In
keeping with this admonition, federal prosecutors presumably endeavor to
exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with community values.
As a local official, the federal prosecutor is in many ways little different
from the state prosecutor; she is a member of the community, at least in
some broad sense, for which she is prosecuting offenses and her authority

to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongfui conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

76.
(1999).

See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1337; see also WILLIAM T. Pizzi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH

77. See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1337-38, 1342 (noting the political controls on prosecutors
and even those appointed as federal prosecutors by the President); see also William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy RelationshipBetween CriminalProcedure and CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1997)

("On the government's side, prosecutors are bureaucrats; like other bureaucrats, their activity level is
largely governed by their budgets. Rationing in this setting is akin to queuing, albeit in a system
where the prosecutor defines one's place in line.").
78.

Green & Zacharias, supra note 67.

79. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute,77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
321, 327 (2002) ("In a world of limited resources, prosecutors must act in accordance with the priorities of their funding authorities.").
80. Frase, supra note 68, at 249 ("[Tlhe federal prosecutor is not an elected official, and is
not subject to popular political pressures, although he may be removed by the President.").
81.

Jackson, supra note 61, at 20.
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derives normatively from her representation of that community. In that respect, the only real difference, for most offenses, is that the federal
prosecutor's "community" is simply a larger district than the state prosecutor's community and the range of prosecutable offenses is more narrow.
Thus, it is easy for the federal prosecutor to exercise his authority in a manner consistent with community mores if he so chooses. In most
circumstances, he presumably can intuit them almost as well as a state
prosecutor can.
B. The FederalProsecutorin Indian Country

An implicit justification for the modem federal Indian country criminal
justice regime is that the United States has a responsibility to preserve public safety on Indian reservations." Indeed, the regime does not purport to be
primarily responsible for public safety throughout the general community
encompassing the entire federal judicial district or state but merely concerns
those communities that lie within the jurisdictional confines of "Indian
country," as that term is defined in the United States Code. In other words,
the regime is designed to provide public safety and criminal justice in Indian
country and the statutory scheme is geographically defined as applying only
to that area.84 Given that background, the apparent responsibility of the
prosecutor in an Indian country case is to represent-and protect-the Indian country community.85
1. The Prosecutoras Representativeof the Community

For a variety of reasons, one might be highly skeptical of the ability of a
federal prosecutor to represent the Indian country community. Unlike the
usual circumstances, in which the prosecutor internalizes and acts in accordance with the mores and values of the community (of which she
theoretically is a part), a federal prosecutor in Indian country may live hundreds of miles from the reservation and may not even speak the language
used in that community. She may not be able to understand and internalize
the values of the community that she theoretically protects.

82.
See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS
IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978); WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF "JUSTICE" IN AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
(1975).
83.
See Contemporary Tribal Governments: Challenges in Law Enforcement Related to the
Rulings of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th
Cong. 9-11 (2002) (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger, U.S. Att'y for the Dist. of Minn.), available at http://Indian.senate.gov/2002hrgs/071102hrg/heffelfinger.pdf ("Since 1885, when Congress
passed the Major Crimes Act, United States Attorneys have had primary responsibility for the prosecution of serious violent crime in Indian country." (citation omitted)).
84.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

85.
Thus, the Indian country case stands in contrast to the normal situation in which "the
prosecutor's client is the [general] public." See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 866 n. 106.
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The federal prosecutor's lack of membership in the Indian country
community is not the only obstacle she will face in intuiting community
values. First, she is not present on a daily basis within the community to
participate in ongoing communications about community values and mores.
She will not know, firsthand, what the community is talking about or concerned about. Second, since many Indian communities are closed and
suspicious of outsiders, it is unrealistic to believe that they will easily confide in a federal prosecutor about matters that are important to them.
This critique, at first blush, may not seem to be limited to Indian country
cases. Admittedly, a federal judicial district is composed of numerous heterogeneous "communities," and members of many communities, especially
the minority communities within the jurisdiction, might feel that the local
prosecutors do not internalize their values and thus do not "represent" them.
An African American community, for example, may feel that prosecutors
are unfairly targeting it. While Indian country communities have a somewhat stronger claim because of the explicitly geographical jurisdictional
grant, it is important to remember Felix Cohen's famous metaphor of Indians as the "miner's canary" with the treatment of Indians reflecting8 6 the
health of American policy and democratic values beyond Indian policy.
The Indian country regime, in explicitly creating a scheme for prosecuting local offenses with no national nexus and applying only to Indian
country, offers insight into our national psyche. 87 While federal law may not
consciously single out African American communities, its willingness to
single out "Indian country" for special treatment in this way may be cause
for broader concerns by other communities. In Indian country, the federal
prosecutor is alien to the community and less able or unable to understand,
internalize and protect, or even act in accordance with, the community's
values. Perhaps such an official simply is not institutionally competent. This
gives rise to a related problem.
2. The Accountability Problem

The alignment between the prosecutor and community values that serves
as the normative foundation for broad prosecutorial discretion is supported,
in most American jurisdictions, by prosecutorial accountability through the
political process. The crimes enumerated and prosecuted under the federal
Indian country regime are crimes that Roscoe Pound would have characterized as crimes against "local order."8 8 Outside of Indian country, such crimes
are routinely prosecuted by local (state) prosecutors elected by the local

86.
1982).

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,

at v (Rennard Strickland ed.,

87.
While some of my criticisms might also apply to certain federal enclaves such as military
bases, application of federal rules on federal enclaves does not have the same ramifications as federal rules on Indian reservations where, presumably, an existing community has addressed such
issues since time immemorial.
88.

ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA

151 (1930).
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community or county in which the crime occurred.89 Indeed, one of the
common qualifications of standing for election as a state or local prosecutor
is residency within the jurisdiction. 90 Thus, in theory, the elected prosecutor
is not only an elected agent of the people but almost always is also a member of the community in which the crime occurred. 9'
Though prosecutors are representatives of the public, prosecutors have
their own personal interests in deciding which cases to prosecute. Many
commentators have noted what might collectively be called "agency problems ' 92 that prevent perfect alignment of the interests of the prosecutors and
the public. For reasons discussed immediately here and above, these
"agency problems" are far more severe in Indian country. At the other end of
the spectrum, some scholars have expressed appropriate concern about
prosecutors who are too accountable to the community. 9' Others have expressed the notion that the accountability question is more complex than it
seems. 94 Prosecutors may seek to vindicate community values that are reflected in laws or they may seek to vindicate community values that are
inflamed in a particular egregious case. Most commentators would agree
that prosecutors should resist the "momentary hue and cry" of the public in
a "heated moment" and remain true instead to the public will in a more general sense as "expressed over time in the law and popular culture." 95
However, such debates are entirely academic for Indian tribes.
Federal Indian country prosecutors are less likely to feel any pressure to
be accountable to either type of. community will. The political power of Indian tribal communities over their (federal) prosecutors is strikingly
different from the political power over the prosecutors who bring the same
kind of cases in non-Indian communities. Because federal prosecutors are
appointed, rather than elected, direct political accountability is absent in all
Indian country cases, increasing the gulf between the interests of the prosecutors and the community.

89. Cf. Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1338 (noting that state prosecutors are almost always elected
officials).
90. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 215.2 (West 2000) ("The district attorney shall
reside in the county from which he was elected during his term of office.").
91.
See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 605, 643-52 (1998) (asserting that prosecutors are, in
general, representative of their communities).
92. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 865 (1995); Ted
Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 5354 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987-88
(1992).

93.

DAVIS,

94.

See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 870 n. 116.

supra note 66.

95.

Id. at 870.
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That is not to say that federal prosecutors are deaf to popular opinion on
96
Indian reservations. To the extent that prosecutors are attuned to community concerns, though, Indians have the additional problem of dilution.
External motivations, such as the media attention that comes with a high
profile case, are also problematic.97 Indian country cases rarely obtain much
98

media exposure. From the federal prosecutor's perspective, an urban or
suburban bank robbery may very well obtain greater and more sustained

media attention than a multiple homicide on a rural Indian reservation.
Some federal Indian country prosecutors undertake extraordinary forefforts to get to know their Indian communities. Such

ma199 and informal1

knowledge is absolutely crucial to the task. One federal prosecutor has explained, for example, the Navajo cultural norm against looking a person in
the eye, which can be considered "offensive, an affront, even a challenge to

96. Indeed, Professor Frase's assertion that a federal prosecutor "is not subject to popular
political pressures" because "[he] is not an elected official" is true as a formal matter, but it can be
qualified. Frase, supra note 68, at 249; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. A practical,
albeit indirect, constraint on United States Attorneys is the fact that many such officials expect to
seek other appointed or elected office in the future. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to
Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486 (1996) ("U.S. Attorneys are extraordinarily
ambitious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving office."). Though political ambition
likely increases accountability, it does so only marginally with regard to Indian tribes. The reservation communities are just one of many constituent groups and may be the smallest and poorest such
groups at that. Each Indian community is only one of many constituencies of a United States Attorney, and often a small, distant, and poor constituency. And Indian communities, like most poor and
undereducated communities, are notorious for not voting. However, this appears to be changing.
See, e.g., John P. Lavelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participationin American Politics:A Reply to ProfessorPorter,10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533 (2001).
97. See Simons, supra note 67, at 932 ("[There is a] common ...desire of prosecutors to
prosecute highly publicized cases.").
98. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & "Boring" Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 21 401,
403 (2001) (noting that Justice Brennan once referred to an Indian law case as a "chicken-shit" case).
99. Most United States Attorney's Offices in states with Indian country jurisdiction have
explicitly designated an Assistant United States Attorney as a liaison to the Indian tribes within the
jurisdiction. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, OJP Resources for Indian Country, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
americannative/attysoffices.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2005). The tribal liaison positions are somewhat political in nature, that is, the liaison is assigned a relationship with the tribal government,
rather than the tribal community at large. Moreover, in some districts, the USAOs designate a civil
attorney rather than a prosecutor as the liaison to avoid any awkwardness for a liaison serving a role
as prosecutor and also fielding tribal complaints about prosecutions involving tribal members. Federal prosecutors are authorized, though not required, by federal law to report the declination of an
Indian country prosecution to the appropriate Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2809(b) (2000).
100. Following an outbreak of violence on the Red Lake Chippewa Indian reservation in
Minnesota, the United States Attorney in Minnesota publicly said that he was redoubling federal
efforts to address violent crime on that reservation. See Margaret Zack, State-FederalProject
Fights Reservation Violent Crime, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 2002, at 2B (noting that
the Red Lake Reservation, with a population of 5000, had five homicides during a nine-month
period beginning in late 2001). Among other efforts to reach out to the community, the United
States Attorney attended the final game of a 2003 state high school basketball tournament to
cheer for a high school team from the Red Lake Chippewa Indian Reservation. Conversation with
Tom Heffelfinger, June 2003, notes on file with author. Such actions are commendable; they are
not necessarily the norm. The Red Lake school shooting case in March 2005, which cost ten lives
and resulted in a federal juvenile prosecution, dealt a serious blow to federal efforts to improve
crime statistics on that reservation.

February 2006]

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

the other person.'' ° Knowledge of and respect for such a cultural norm
might make a difference in whether the prosecutor will gain or lose the assistance of a key witness. A misstep here can make the difference between a
righteous conviction and a colossal waste of federal resources.
But even for federal prosecutors who are sensitive to cultural differences
and concerned enough to make extraordinary efforts,'0 2 the sheer distance between United States Attorney's Offices and many of the federal Indian
reservations they serve present tremendous obstacles that the average violent
crime prosecutor in the state system does not face. Perhaps as a result, United
States Attorneys have been widely criticized for decades for failing to give
proper attention to Indian country cases.'0 3 The substance of such complaints
enough and alalmost always involves the failure to prosecute aggressively
' 4
most never involves complaints of "over-prosecution."'0
Because of the non-reviewability of decisions to decline prosecution or to
under-prosecute, the weak or nonexistent political accountability of federal
prosecutors to tribal communities, and the lack of media interest in Indian
country prosecutions, federal prosecutors feel little external pressure to treat
Indian country cases seriously. Under such a scheme, well-intentioned federal
prosecutors will work hard in Indian country, and many do. But even high
levels of commitment and interest by federal prosecutors are no substitute for
actual accountability. Those prosecutors who are not committed to Indian
country cases will simply not pursue them. And in Indian country, it is often
101.

Chaney, supra note 54, at 39.

102. Some federal prosecutors are members of Indian tribes and at least one serves his own
reservation, but such circumstances are unusual.
103.

See

CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE

WITH TIMOTHY

CARR

SEWARD,

PLANTING TAIL

FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 162 (1997) ("In practical application, federal

law enforcement agents, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's
Office, have demonstrated a history of declining to investigate or prosecute violations of the Major
Crimes Act."); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian
Interests ill Federal Court, 88 GEo. L.J. 2187, 2188 (2000) ("[M]any U.S. Attorneys have abdicated
their responsibility to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians."); EchoHawk,
supra note 12, at 99-100 ("U.S. Attorneys often decline to prosecute Major Crimes Act cases on the
reservation because of a mixture of factual, legal, practical, or logistical problems."); B.J. Jones,
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity:Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and TribalFederal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 513 (1998) ("Federal prosecutors, busy
with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps have been remiss in devoting the necessary attention to the problems that arise when non-Indians commit offenses in Indian country ....);
Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 963 (2002) ("U.S.
Attorneys, unlike state prosecutors, typically decline to prosecute in a far greater percentage of
cases.... [resulting] in the underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian country."); Amy Radon,
Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the
Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1278 (2004) ("Because federal prosecutors decline to
prosecute [domestic violence], the law provides no deterrent effect ....
");
Tim Vollmann, Criminal
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN.
L. REV. 387, 403 (1974) ("[Olverburdened U.S. Attorneys are not notorious for seeking further
responsibilities of prosecution in Indian Country ....
");cf. Laurence Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction
over Indian Country in Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REV. 62, 72-73 (1959) (noting reluctance of federal
prosecutors and federal courts to handle petty offenses over which they also have jurisdiction in
Indian country, with the result that "petty frauds and simple assaults" by non-Indians against Indians, "which are fairly numerous-usually escape prosecution entirely").
104.

Davis, supra note 103, at 72-73.
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the decisions not to prosecute, cdlled "declinations," that cause the most grief
and consternation.' 5 As a result, it would appear that federal Indian country
prosecutors are failing in precisely the area in which their discretion is subject
to the least scrutiny and accountability. °6 The extensive critical commentary
in academic literature may be the most serious negative repercussion that
these federal officials face. 0 7 The result is that criminal justice in Indian country is occasionally pursued aggressively and is sometime ignored, making
criminal justice a haphazard event at best for Indian tribes.08
Accountability and control of governing institutions has become a key indicator of tribal success in improving tribal economic and social conditions.' °
Indeed, lack of accountability by federal law enforcement has been identified
as a chief problem for effective policing in Indian country."0 Given the close
relationship between police and prosecutors, it follows that lack of accountability by prosecutors may pose similar problems.
In summary, the fundamental criminal law justifications for broad prosecutorial discretion simply do not apply when a federal prosecutor is working
in Indian country. Unlike a narcotics distribution offense, which is subject to
federal jurisdiction wherever it occurs within the exterior boundaries of the
United States, the federal prosecutor has jurisdiction over Indian country offenses only if the offense occurred in Indian country. Yet the federal
prosecutor is unaccountable to the relevant community and has no particular
motivation to address community concerns. The Indian country regime thus
imposes an important responsibility on federal prosecutors without imposing
any accountability. The ramifications of this structural problem are enormous
and undermine the legitimacy of the federal prosecutor's power in Indian
country cases. These problems, though serious, are exacerbated by an even
deeper problem in Indian country cases to which this Article now turns.

105.

See id.

106. To be fair, such complaints are not limited to Indian country. As Roscoe Pound once
wrote about the American system, "[c]omplaint of non-enforcement is as old as the law itself."
POUND, supra note 88, at 12.
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (criticizing federal prosecutors for high declination rates).
108. My colleague Michael Tonry offered the important insight that under-prosecution by
federal prosecutors may not necessarily be problematic because it presumably makes tribal justice
systems more relevant in cases in which the federal authorities decline to prosecute.
109. See generally Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where's the Glue? Institutional and
Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SocIo-EcoN. 443 (2000);
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in
Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 187 (1998); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P.
Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really Come from? Constitutional Rule Among the Contemporary Sioux andApache, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 402 (1995).
110. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42 at 43-44, 49 (concluding that accountability for policing on Indian reservations is diffused both by federal control that reduces tribal involvement and by
diffusing authority among numerous different bureaucratic actors).
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3. FederalProsecutorsand the Cavalry Effect

For many Americans, the phrase, "the cavalry has arrived," has come to
be a humorous and informal euphemism for the arrival of help or rescue; in
popular usage, the phrase presumably creates a sense of relief in the listener.
For Indian tribes, in contrast, the arrival of the cavalry has rarely been cause

for relief or celebration and it often has quite the opposite connotation in
Indian country. To members of many Indian tribes, the word "cavalry"
genocide.' 12
brings to mind oppression, rapaciousness," murder, and even
In Indian country, the federal government is held in the esteem it has
earned in more than two centuries of federal-tribal relations." 3 Its reputation
in Indian country has been forged, in part, by the nineteenth-century cavalry

officers who committed atrocious actions, such as murder," 4 and the Indian
agents who committed atrocious omissions, such as the withholding of
treaty-guaranteed food and supplies in winter. "' Its reputation was formed
by the actions of government officials who used gifts of smallpox-infected
blankets to destroy tribal communities' 6 and by federal officials who unilaterally violated treaties and encouraged private actors to do the same," 7 and,
in more recent years, the federal trustee that lost track of the records of millions and perhaps billions of dollars of Indian assets held by the Department

of the Interior in tribal accounts and Individual Indian Money accounts." 8

Enter the well-intentioned federal prosecutor seeking to prosecute a vio-

lent crime in Indian country. While federal prosecutors may be talented and
committed public servants who are trying to "do good" by helping to provide public safety or bringing justice to Indian country, each carries

tremendous moral, emotional, and symbolic freight of which he may not

111. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS WHITE JUSTICE (1999) (discussing General
George Custer's extraordinary efforts to appeal to gold prospectors to violate federal treaty obligations that protected the Black Hills in the Great Sioux Nation).
112. While words like "genocide" should be used advisedly, it is surely appropriate in the
context of the Wounded Knee and Sand Creek massacres, both of which involved the indiscriminate
killing of women and children by American soldiers. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 194-95 (Sand Creek), 292-93 (Wounded Knee) (1989).
113. Then-Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover issued an apology to tribes on behalf of the BIA
in September of 2000. Brian Stockes, Gover Apologizes for Atrocities of the Past, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=63 1.
114.

DEBO, supra note 112, at 194-95, 292-93.

115.

See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).

116. For one account and citation to much of the historical literature on these events, see
Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviationsfrom Constitutional
Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 405-07
(2003).
117.

See LAZARUS, supra note I 1l.

118. See Cobell v. Norton, No. 1:96CV01285, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14303 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
20, 2003).
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even be aware. Indians and Indian tribes have long memories. Such is the
power of oral traditions." 9
Though experiences vary from tribe to tribe, the federal prosecutor in Indian country is, in some respects, the direct lineal descendant of the bluecoated, sword-wielding cavalry officer; the prosecutor represents the very
same federal government that committed cruel and violent acts against Indian
tribes for more than a century. He represents the government that has made
and then broken sacred promises. Yet he shows up on the tribal member's
doorstep with the claim, "I am here to help you obtain justice." Given the history of federal-tribal relations, tribes have every reason to be suspicious of
such an official and such a claim. In a real sense, for many reservation Indians, the federal government continues to represent the enemy.
In such a context, the federal prosecution creates a political dynamic in
the tribe that must be addressed in virtually every case. Consider a typical
case of sexual abuse of a child: after the child victim reluctantly reports an
incident of abuse by another family member, it is surprisingly common for
the victim's family members to align themselves with the defendant and
against the victim. This is not unheard of outside Indian country, ' 2 but it
represents a particularly serious problem in Indian country cases.' 2 The dynamic, though extremely unfortunate, is explainable. When the federal
government accuses a community member of a heinous offense and brings a
criminal complaint or an indictment, the community may naturally become
protective of the accused defendant in the face of this outside authority, even
if the charges are based on a report by another tribal member. The family
may not perceive its choice as one between the perpetrator and the victim,
but between a tribal member and the United States government. As a result,
when the family chooses sides, it may line up behind the perpetrator and
against the child who has been victimized.
Given the long history of federal-tribal relations, the federal prosecutor22
simply may not be anyone whom the community has any reason to trust.1

119.

See, e.g., John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical,Political and Legal Implications of

American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2001) (describing the power and legitimacy of tribal oral histories).
120.

Christine Adams, Note, Mothers Who Fail to Prtect Their Childrenfrom Sexual Abuse:

Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 519, 523-24 (1994) (describing the
phenomenon and some of its harms).
121.
EchoHawk, supra note 12, at 99 (noting that an Indian parent's fear of losing custody
can cause the parent to support "herself, her family, and even the perpetrator" against white institutions (quoting Irl Carter & Lawrence J. Parker, Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse in American Indian
Familes, in FAMILY SEXUAL ABUSE: FRONTLINE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 106, 114 (Michael
Quinn Patton ed., 1991))).
122. Id. ("Many Indians distrust the legal and social authorities that could be most helpful to
them because of past experiences of unjust treatment."); cf Ronald S. Fischler, Child Abuse and
Neglect in American Indian Communities, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 95, 98 (1985) (noting that
even Indian Health Service physicians are "mistrusted as outsiders and federal government employees"). This phenomenon is familiar to many criminal law professors who teach State v. Williams,
484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), a tragic case in which uneducated American Indian parents
were charged with manslaughter after failing to obtain medical treatment for their seventeen-monthold son for fear that the baby would be taken from them.

February 20061

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

The result is that the child victim is victimized anew by a political dynamic
that aligns the victim with the United States and against the community and
the defendant. 23 This dynamic may well cause further psychological injuries
to the child victim of sexual assault and lead to the victim's alienation and
estrangement from family members. In that respect, a new harm is done to
the child that might not have occurred in the absence of the federal prosecutor. According to experts in the field, this alienation of a child from the
family often has psychological ramifications that are even more serious than
the harm done by the perpetrator of the sex offense. 24 In addition to harming
victims, the dynamic may cause numerous lesser evils, such as practical
problems in prosecutions. It sometimes, no doubt, causes victims to recant
and frustrates effective prosecutions of sexual predators.12 As a result, sexual predators are not effectively removed from the community.
Use of a federal prosecutor likely creates a host of other less-serious
problems as well. Even leaving out the emotional and historical baggage
that creates the political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry effect," child sex abuse cases are among the most difficult cases to prosecute
successfully, even in the best of circumstances. As an alien to the community, the federal prosecutor is likely to find it difficult to communicate with
the Indian child and even more difficult to convince the child victim to participate in a trial. As evidence that these problems are very real, federal
prosecutors have taken to employing "victim-witness coordinators"'' 26 who
often work to bridge the cultural gap between the Indian victims and the
federal prosecutors. Without the assistance of the victim-witness advocates, Indian country prosecutions would be far less successful.
While the child sexual assault case presents perhaps the most tragic instance of this phenomenon, the "cavalry effect" likely occurs, to some
degree, in any case in which the United States sides with an Indian victim
against an Indian perpetrator in an intratribal dispute. Indeed, the dynamic
has existed in tribes since the early nineteenth century in many different
circumstances as tribal members turned against others who assisted federal
officials. 128
The cavalry metaphor offers one other key insight: the cavalry chooses
its battles carefully and then leaves when the battle is over. One telltale sign
of the lack of trust of federal law enforcement and prosecutors is the fact

123. This phenomenon is present in many intrafamily child sex abuse cases, see Adams, supra
note 120, but it is likely exacerbated in cases involving a federal prosecutor and an Indian community.
124.

Id. (citing numerous authorities).

125. See generally Fischler, supra note 122, at 102 (noting that families often suppress evidence and bring pressure on victims to change their testimony).
126. See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Victim and Witness
Assistance Unit, http://www.justice.gov/usao/wie/vicwit/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2005).
127.

The USAOs frequently hire tribal members to serve in these positions.

128.

Cf Ex pane Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); MORRIs L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL His1838-1907, at 16-19 (1938) (discussing the murder of Cherokee
leader John Ross apparently for his role in agreeing to federal efforts at Cherokee removal).
TORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
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that many crimes are never even reported. 2 9 One key reason for the failure
to report is that victims do not trust the federal authorities to protect them
from retaliation. 30 Like the cavalry, federal prosecutors and FBI' agents
swoop in occasionally to prosecute a perpetrator, but they do not maintain a
constant presence and do not necessarily consider the broader impact of
their work. They address only the serious offenses and they leave when each
case is concluded. It is up to the tribal community to address other offenses
and the aftermath of the felony and to attempt to restore the fabric of the
community. Even assuming that the federal prosecutors who agree to handle
such cases are generous, selfless, and committed to bettering the lives of the
reservation community (as most of them no doubt are), even the best of intentions may not always be able to overcome the handicaps noted herein.
Consider one obvious alternative approach: a tribal prosecutor. As a
member of the Indian country community, a tribal prosecutor might face
few of the handicaps that the federal prosecutor faces. A tribal prosecutor
would not be forced into the same dynamic-she could represent the
community and the community would feel less of a need to attempt to protect the defendant against an external authority. In addition, unlike the
federal prosecutor, a tribal prosecutor would presumably live within the
community. This would convey a much stronger sense of interest and investment in the community and would allow the prosecutor to help the
community address the collateral issues that arise from the prosecution.
The presence of the prosecutor within the community might also give
greater comfort to those victims of crime who are unwilling to come forward. Moreover, a tribal prosecutor might act-in a variety of ways-in a
fashion more compatible with community norms.
4. Obstacles to Tribal Governance and Self-Determination
In addition to the problems noted above, the role of federal prosecutors
creates a serious obstacle to tribal self-determination. Use of a federal
prosecutor to address major crimes between Indians sends a clear message
of inferiority about tribal law enforcement and tribal courts, that is, that
tribes cannot handle felonies. And it robs the tribal community of leadership
in one of the most important areas of governance: maintenance of public
safety and criminal justice. In some respects, the system can create a vacuum of tribal leadership on public safety issues that can exacerbate crime
problems by sidelining the people who might be best able to address these
serious issues.
Consider the political ramifications at the tribal level. In myriad ways,
federal prosecutors need the assistance of tribal governments in prosecuting
Indian country cases. They may need evidence from a tribal registrar that a

129.

WAKELING ET AL.,

130.

Id.

supra note 42, at 13-14.
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particular victim or defendant is a tribal member.'3' Or they may need official tribal real property records documenting the status of the land on which
the offense occurred. Or they may simply need help locating witnesses. But
even in circumstances in which the assistance of tribal officials is crucial to
the prosecution of the case, it may be politically problematic for a tribal official to appear to be assisting federal prosecutors in the prosecution of a
tribal member.132 In such a case, the system essentially asks a tribal official
to take sides not only against one of his own constituents but with a longtime enemy. In that respect, the "cavalry effect" may animate tribal officials
in the same way that it takes hold in Indian families; it may make tribal officials reluctant to assist federal prosecutors.
The existence of the federal prosecutor thus creates structural barriers to
tribal participation in the prosecution. While tribal leaders may be criticized
when they fail to provide assistance in such circumstances (and perhaps they
should be), these structural problems simply do not exist in other federal
prosecutorial contexts or in state prosecutions of crimes equivalent to those
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. This handicap is created solely by the
dynamics of the federal scheme.
Other serious political ramifications exist as well. Tribal officials are
likely more knowledgeable than federal officials about remote Indian reservations and are also likely to be much more responsive to the tribal community.
Yet a tribal leader running for election would be ill-advised to promise his
constituents that he could address serious public safety and criminal justice
problems on the reservation; he simply lacks control of the key resources.133
To make such a promise, he would need to have assurances from federal officials. Given the history of promises by federal officials, even in sacred
treaties, a tribal official would be foolish to count on any such assurance. As a
result, even in circumstances in which tribal governments do not actively seek
to frustrate federal prosecutions, tribal leaders are much less likely to be invested in felony criminal justice. One of the telltale signs of the lack of official
interest in these issues is the fact that crime statistics are so difficult to obtain
for Indian reservations. ' 34 One would be hard-pressed to find a mayor of a
major American city who was unaware of the crime rate for that city. Yet tribal
leaders do not routinely collect such data and would be hard-pressed to answer such a question, partially no doubt because they often do not have line
authority over the law enforcement officers involved. 35 If tribal political
131.
United States v. Prentiss, 273 F3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that proof of tribal
status of victim and or defendant may be an element of the offense).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D.N.M. 1999). In Velarde, the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe sought to quash federal subpoenas that the United States Attorney served on
various tribal officials in order to establish jurisdiction over a defendant accused of raping an eightyear-old child. Id. The court rejected the tribe's efforts to prevent federal prosecutors from gaining
access to tribal records. Id. at 1315.
133.

See supra text accompanying notes 20-57.

134. See WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42, at vii (explaining that, for a variety of reasons,
tribal-level data about crime in Indian country is unavailable).
135.

Id.
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leaders are unwilling to use their limited resources or stake their reputations
on improvement in this key area of tribal public policy, then improvements
may never occur.
Viewed from the standpoint of federal officials, the situation is equally
untenable. The existence of exclusively federal jurisdiction for felonies in
Indian country shifts the apparent responsibility to maintain institutions that
help to provide safe reservation environments away from local tribal officials and toward federal officials. 116 The tribal leaders who have been
rendered impotent by the scheme theoretically can criticize and blame the
federal prosecutors but must shoulder little of the blame or accountability
for the problem. Thus, while federal prosecutors lack any sense of accountability, they also likely do not even feel much appreciation for their work in
many cases.
In short, the federal Indian country regime creates an unfortunate and
indefensible paradox. It wrests control of the key and inherently local issue
of felony criminal justice away from tribal leadership and places control
over these issues in the hands of federal officials who have little accountability to the tribal community and little incentive to be responsive. The
result is not only irrational from a criminal justice standpoint; it is contrary
to the stated federal policies of tribal self-determination and selfgovernance.
37

C. Concluding Thoughts about FederalProsecutors1
Locating the power to prosecute in a federal official from outside the
reservation poses numerous practical problems, such as difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of witnesses at trial, and creates structural problems by
often converting the tribal government into an opponent of the prosecution,
even when the prosecution would otherwise have worked to produce a safer
reservation environment. The cavalry effect and other problems related to
the Indian country criminal justice system inflict serious costs on the community and serious damage to individual Indian defendants and victims.
This model of criminal justice, in which prosecutions are handled by an outside authority and not the tribal government, creates a system that smacks
more of colonialism than of rational criminal justice policy. It simply is not
consistent with modern principles of federal Indian policy and it is dysfunctional from the standpoint of federal criminal justice policy. It is for this
reason that federal Indian country prosecutions should be "de-colonized."

136. Cf Simons, supra note 67, at 931 ("When Congress expands the Department [of Justice's] authority to fight local crime, it also expands the Department's responsibility to fight local
crime." (emphasis added)).
137. Because of the practical problems noted above and others, critical questions can also be
raised about the ability of federal defenders to provide competent representation in Indian country
cases. In the interest of space, the author leaves that subject for another day.
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III.

JURIES AND JURY COMPOSITION IN INDIAN COUNTRY

While the prosecutor is ideally supposed to "represent" the community,
the greatest opportunity for the community to participate affirmatively in the
administration of criminal justice is, of course, through juries. In the American criminal justice system, the jury trial is constituted not only as a key
procedural safeguard to the defendant,
to138 give the community a central
•
- • but
role in the administration of criminal justice.
The importance of the jury has been dramatically underscored-and
strongly reaffirmed-in a series of recent Supreme Court cases. In Jones v.
9 Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 0
41
United States,
Blakely v.
42
143Ring v. Arizona,
4
Washington, and United States v. Booker the Supreme Court used the
Sixth Amendment to strike down state and federal laws that sought to limit
the role of the jury in American criminal justice. Juries were given a hallowed role in the American judicial system when the founders created the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. And, as these cases illustrate, that role is
just as important to the criminal trial today as it was then. For reasons set
forth more fully below, the Indian country community tends to be absent
from the juries that hear Indian country cases. Because of the central importance of community participation, through juries, in insuring the legitimacy
of federal convictions, I argue that the absence of the Indian community is a
serious problem. This Part will explain why juries are important, how the
Supreme Court and Congress have sought to ensure their representativeness,
why Indian country juries fall short, and why challenges to this system have
been unsuccessful.
A. The Centralityof the Jury in American CriminalJustice
The Constitution guarantees that "trial of all crimes ... shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed."'" The Sixth Amendment creates additional rules, guaranteeing, inter alia, "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State" and that the trial occur in the "district wherein the crime shall
138.
Some scholars, such as Akhil Amar, argue that community involvement is not merely a
safeguard for the defendant, but also represents the community's independent right to be involved in

criminal justice.

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND

RECONSTRUCTION

(1998).
139.
526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that facts rendering defendant subject to greater statutory
penalties must be treated as elements of the offense and found by the jury).

140.

530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum

must be found by the jury).
141.
536 U.S. 584 (2002) (noting that the presence or absence of aggravating factors that
would lead to imposition of the death penalty must be found by jury).

142.

542 U.S. 296 (2004) (determining that facts relevant to mandatory guidelines must be

found by the jury).

143.
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (recognizing that the Federal Sentencing Reform Act did not meet
the Sixth Amendment requirements for jury involvement in sentencing).
144.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This is often referred to as the "venue requirement."
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have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law ..

,,45

While the language of the Sixth Amendment is phrased as a guarantee
of the rights of the criminal defendant, both the Sixth Amendment and
Article III's trial provision are thought to serve a valuable community interest as well: insuring the community's participation in the criminal
justice system.'4
The motivation for enacting these provisions can be found in key events
that occurred shortly before this nation's founding.147 Following the Boston
Massacre in which British soldiers were accused of killing American colo-

nists, the British soldiers were tried in Boston before local juries.

48 Because

the British Parliament wished to prevent future trials of British soldiers,
which might occur before biased juries, the British Parliament enacted the
Administration of Justice Act that provided that British officials would
49

thereafter be taken to England and tried there for crimes in the colonies.

This Act was one of the "Intolerable Acts" complained of in the Declaration
of Independence. 5 Thus, at the time of the founding of the Republic, the

Founders had clear reason to be aware of the need 5 to preserve local participation in criminal justice, through the jury system.

1

The Founders' concerns for preserving local control over criminal justice continue to inform interpretation of the constitutional provisions that
they drafted. Writing for the Court in Smith v. Texas"' in 1940, Justice Black

described juries as "instruments of public justice" and held that a jury must
be constituted in large measure in a manner that ensures that it is "a body

145.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

146. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptoriesor Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images, and Procedures,64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 546 (1986) ("One function of the jury, although not
the only function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system
by injecting representative community voices and values into the decision process."); see also
Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice:A Three-State Study, 57
VAND. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004) ("Theoretically, jury sentences would take into account the full
range of penalties authorized by the legislature and mirror community norms concerning retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."). King and Noble also refer to juries as a "community-based barometer" of punishment. Id.
147.
See generally AMAR, supra note 138, at 106; see also BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG,
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1766-1775, at 66-69 (1975) (discussing colonial up-

heaval over British attempts to remove treason trials to Great Britain in 1769).
148.

See generally HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 225-303 (1970) (providing a

detailed account of the Boston Massacre trials, jury selections, and effects of the verdicts on the
Boston population).
149.

KNOLLENBERG, supra note 147, at 119 (discussing outrage over the Administration of

Justice Act labeled "The Murdering Act" by many colonials); Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A ConstitutionalArgument,75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1683 (2000).
150.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 17 (U.S. 1776).

151. See generally Engel, supra note 149, at 1684-85 (discussing how the Continental Congress responded to British attempts to remove trials from the hands of local juries: "The Continental
Congress understood the vicinage presumption to be a structural property of the 'great right,' one
that served not only the interests of the defendant, but those of the community as well").
152.

311 U.S. 128, 130(1940).
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truly representative of the community."'53 Shortly thereafter, in Glasser v.
United States,54 the Court indicated that a representative jury is fundamental
to the "basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative govemment."'55
The notion that the jury's primary purpose is to represent the community
comes through in many modem cases as well. In Taylor v. Louisiana,1 6 for
example, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional notion of trial by
jury implicitly "presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative
of the community.
Highlighting the "political function" of the jury, the
Supreme Court explained, "the jury is designed not only to understand the5
case, but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it." 1
According to the Court, "[c]ommunity participation in the administration of
the criminal law ... is. .. 59critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system."
It would take many pages to provide a full catalogue of the Supreme
Court's statements as to the role that juries serve in the American criminal
justice system. The most consistent theme underlying all of these functions,
however, is that the jury provides a role for the community in criminal justice. ' 6° A recent case reflects the essence of much of the Supreme Court's
rhetoric:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of
justice has long been recognized as one of the principle justifications for
retaining the jury system....
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the
right of parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all the
people. It affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in
a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for
law. Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens, the honor and

153. Smith, 311 U.S. at 130. Professor Massaro argues that this represents the first time the
Court recognized the interest of community values in this context. See Massaro, supra note 146, at
532. Professor Randall Kennedy finds such an interest recognized as early as Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 170 (1997).
154.

315 U.S. 60 (1942).

155.

Glasser, 315 U.S. at 85.

156.

419 U.S. 522 (1975).

157. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
158. Id. at 529 & n.7 (quoting with approval a House Report on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, at 8 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1797).
159.

Id. at 530.

160. See Massaro, supra note 146, at 512 ("Popular participation in criminal trials also serves
community interests.... Juries... satisfy the community's desire to participate in, and consequently to effect some control over, the criminal justice system. The jury interjects community
conscience into the process, if only symbolically.").
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privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process.161

The Supreme Court has also suggested myriad ways in which juries improve
the quality of criminal justice, many of which hinge directly on community
involvement. One broad way that juries improve the criminal justice system
is simply by providing twelve different human perspectives on the evidence
162
and thus improving the quality of the ultimate verdict.

Perhaps one of the most compelling functions of the jury is to serve as
one of the "checks and balances" in American governance.' 63 The jury

guards against official corruption by pulling together a group of citizens and
'64
empowering them to watch over the work of the prosecutor and the judge.
The jury interposes the "common sense judgment" of the community between the defendant and powerful government officials.16 For many of these
reasons, the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana'66 that juries are
fundamental to our system of ordered liberty and that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process provision incorporates the right to a trial by jury
and thus requires state courts to provide juries.

Another major function that juries serve is overtly political and it goes in
two directions. Just as communities, through juries, affect the administration

of criminal justice, the criminal justice system uses the jury to educate the
public and to ensure the legitimacy of the system. Jury duty "educates citizens in the mechanics of their justice system."' 16 Juries ensure "public

confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system"' 68 and ensure pub-

161.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Given the rhetoric of Supreme Court cases, one can easily see why some of the members of Congress who favored passage of the Major Crimes Act thought that participation in federal criminal
justice might have the effect of "civilizing" and assimilating the Indians. The problem is that adoption of the Major Crimes Act did not come hand-in-hand with Indian participation on federal juries
or in any role in the judicial process, other than as defendants.
162. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 535 (discussing the "quality of community judgment represented by
the jury in criminal trials").
163.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).

164. Id. at 155. By placing the ultimate decisionmaking powers in the jury, the existing structure guards against corruption of judicial officers. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 121 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
165.

See Massaro,supra note 146, at 510.

166.

391 U.S. 145 (1968).

167. Massaro, supra note 146, at 515; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 400 (1990);
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:Measuring the Effects of Juror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 115 (1993) ("In addition, because jury trials educate jurors
in self-governance, deterring discriminatory jury selection practices helps to ensure that all citizens
have an equal opportunity for the civic education jury service provides." (citation omitted)); Massaro, supra note 146, at 515 ("A powerful reminder of the educational aspect of jury trials is the
positive reaction many citizens have to their service as jurors. Moreover, to the extent their encounter with the justice system increases jurors' respect for judgments, it preserves government power."
(citation omitted)).
168.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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lic acceptance of judicial outcomes. 69 They "satisfy the community's desire
to participate in, and consequently to effect some control over, the criminal
justice system."'"7 It is for this reason that some Justices would even hold
that the Eighth Amendment proscription on cruel and unusual punishment
contains an implicit principle that capital punishment may be imposed only
by a jury and not by a judge; the jury has a "comparative advantage" over
the judge in expressing "the community's moral sensibility" and is more
likely to "express the conscience of the community."' 7
B. RepresentativeJuriesand Anti-Discriminationin Jury Composition
Because of the key role that the jury plays in representing the community, the Supreme Court began addressing racially discriminatory jury
composition soon after the Civil War. In Strauderv. West Virginia'72 in 1879,
the Supreme Court overturned a black man's murder conviction because the
state had explicitly excluded blacks from serving on the jury, holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits exclusion of
black jurors from juries in state courts. The Court discussed two different
types of rights in its decision. First, it recognized that the black community
has a "right to participate in the administration of the law" that may not be
denied through racially discriminatory state laws.17 Second, the Court recognized the right of the black defendant to a trial by a jury selected without
discrimination against others of his race.114
The very next year, in Neal v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that
even de facto discrimination was actionable.' 75 In that case, even though
Delaware's law was not explicit in excluding blacks, the Supreme Court
overturned a black defendant's rape conviction on the basis of de facto discrimination in light of evidence establishing that a black person had never
served on a jury in the entire state of Delaware. 7 6 In other words, the jury's
representative role was so important that the Court was willing to protect it
against even possibly accidental and unintentional actions that diminished
the jury's representativeness.
169. See id.; see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707, 751 (1993) (suggesting
that a goal of race-conscious jury selection is that "it enhances public respect for criminal proceedings and acceptance of their results"); Massaro, supra note 146, at 517 ("[Jlury selection procedures
must produce juries that correspond to people's images of a fair jury. Otherwise, people will distrust
jury verdicts regardless of the 'correctness' of those results on the merits, and the jury will lose the
respect essential to effective decision making.").
170.

Massaro, supra note 146, at 512.

171. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613-14 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Justice
Stevens's dissent in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-26 (1995)).
172.

100 U.S. 303 (1880).

173.

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308; see also KENNEDY, supra note 153, at 169-71.

174.

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.

175.

103 U.S. 370 (1881).

176.

Neal, 103 U.S. at 370.
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During the next century, the Court's jurisprudence on juries expanded
tremendously. In the 1930s, the Court used the precedent in Neal v. Delaware to overturn convictions of black defendants in an Alabama county in
which no living person could remember a black person ever serving on a
jury 77 and in a Kentucky county in which no black person had served in the
previous thirty years.171
In 1968, during the civil rights movement, Congress enacted a law governing the selection of federal juries that codified much of the antidiscrimination jurisprudence enunciated by the Supreme Court in these
cases and others. The Jury Selection and Service Act 7 9 ("JSSA") now provides the basic legal rules that apply to jury selection in federal cases,
including those arising in Indian country. The JSSA generally provides that
all litigants in federal courts who are entitled to trial by jury "shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of
the community."''

°

While the statutory rules for jury selection apply in both civil and
criminal cases, the Supreme Court has elevated the JSSA's rules to constitutional status in criminal cases, holding that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an "impartial" jury means a jury that is selected from a venire
that constitutes a "fair cross section of the community."' 8' Despite the
statutory guidance in the JSSA, Supreme Court case law continues to inform the analysis substantially.
In Duren v. Missouri,"' the Supreme Court set forth an analytical approach to determine whether the fair cross section requirement was violated.
To prove such a claim, the defendant must establish:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.113
While the requirement of a fair cross-section does not extend to the final
composition of the jury,' g4 racial discrimination in the selection of the jury is
177.

Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).

178.

Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938).

179.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (2000).

180.

28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).

181. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Because federal law does not distinguish
between the methods of selection of the pools from which grand or petit juries are chosen and the
similar community representative purposes of each type of jury, the courts have treated issues as to
the selection of either type of jury similarly. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (2000)).
182.

Duren, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).

183.

Id. at 364 (internal quotations omitted).

184. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538; see also Holland, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). In Holland, the Court
indicated that the Sixth Amendment requires a venire that is representative of the community so that
a jury will be "drawn from a representative cross section of the community," id. at 480 (quoting

February 2006]

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

considered an unconstitutional "harm" to the "entire community" that "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."' 5
Focusing primarily on African Americans, Professor Randall Kennedy
has addressed many of the problems related to underrepresentation of members of minority groups on juries. As Kennedy has explained, the failure to
include African Americans on juries regarding crimes that affect their communities can have serious practical ramifications.1 6 A community denied its
proper role in the criminal justice system may feel aggrieved and may seek
justice by other means. Consider, for example, the trial against white police
officers accused of beating African American Rodney King, which was
moved out of Los Angeles to Simi Valley, a predominantly white suburb.
When the Simi Valley jury returned not guilty verdicts on the most serious
charges, members of the black community in Los Angeles perceived a miscarriage of justice. The ensuing riot was the most destructive in the United
States in the twentieth century, culminating in fifty-two deaths, thousands of
injuries, and nearly a billion dollars of property damage. 87 In any event,
positive law in the United States has created general rules that ensure the
Rodney King case is exceptional. American law is generally protective of
the jury's community-representative role in criminal justice.
C. Underrepresentationof Native Americans on Indian Country Juries

Despite the normative principle of representativeness, Indians tend not
to be well represented in federal juries in Indian country cases. Even in
states with large Indian populations, Indians remain a very small fraction of
the population. As a result, Indians would be expected to have minimal
representation in the jury venire. However, the statistics indicate lower
numbers than one would expect. Underrepresentation even of the existing
small fraction of the population may occur for a variety of reasons. First,
Indians are among the poorest Americans. s9 Because juries in most federal

Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527), but that "[t]he 'representativeness' constitutionally required at the venire
stage can be disrupted" for good reason while empanelling the jury through the exercise of peremptory and cause strikes against particular members, id. at 483.
185.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).

186.

KENNEDY,supra note

153, at 117-18.

187. Id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Such civil unrest may be effective in gaining the attention of policymakers in ways that mere case law cannot.
188. Even in the states with the largest percentages of American Indians, Indians account for
less than twenty percent of the total population and usually less than ten percent. See STELLA U.
OGUNWOLE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

CAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION:

CENSUS

2000

BRIEF: THE AMERI-

2000, at 5 (2002).

189. Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriersto Native American Home Ownership on Tribal
Lands: The Case of the Navajo Partnershipfor Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 434-35 (2001) ("Indians are among the poorest Americans. In 1990, almost one third (31.2 percent) lived in povertymuch higher than the 1990 national 13.5 percent poverty rate." (citation omitted)); see also Russel
Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277,
287 (1993) (declaring Indians to be "among the poorest Americans").
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districts are chosen from state voter rolls, '90 "federal jury venires underrepresent the poor" who are less likely to register to vote and, even if they have
registered, are more likely to have moved since they last registered.' 9'
Even aside from poverty, Indians may well have lower representation in
the potential pool than their small absolute numbers might forecast. Indians
are, for example, likely to be far more invested in their tribal governments
than state governments. 9 Since juries are routinely selected from voter reg-

istration lists of state political subdivisions, even relatively politically active
and aware tribal members may nevertheless not be represented if they focus
their activism solely within the tribal government. While the JSSA seems to

allow use of tribal voting registration lists, it does not require such use.193
Perhaps most important, however, is the geographic aspect of the problem. The federal districts that include Indian reservations are physically

among the largest in the United States. 9 4 Because of the tremendous sizes of
the districts, each judicial district is divided into multiple divisions. Most
federal courts are located in larger cities, and they tend to assemble jury ve-

nires from the division in which they sit. And even if the court attempts to
assemble juries from a division that includes Indian reservations, the trial
division.19 5
may well be held in an even more distant location in another
190. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2000) (indicating
that each federal district must create its own plan for jury selection and indicating that such plan
shall use voter registration records or lists of actual voters from political subdivisions within the
state); see also King, supra note 169, at 712-17 (discussing some of the factors-for example, unrepresentative voter registration lists, mobility of population, educational history-that make
minorities less likely to be represented fairly in jury pools).
Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL.
191.
L. REV. 101, 103-04 (1996) (collecting studies across the country concluding that the poor are
underrepresented).
192. Some Indians feel that the unilateral extension of American citizenship to them without
their consent was an act of "cultural genocide." See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the GenocidalAct of Forcing American
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 (1999). It would be fair to
assume that many Native Americans holding these views might not register to vote in federal or
state elections.
193. The JSSA allows the names of prospective jurors to be selected from the "voter registration lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions within the district or division." 28
U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2); see also United States v. Bushyhead, 270 E3d 905, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing the Nevada federal jury selection plan as using the voter registration information only of
state and county offices and not of tribal governments).
194. There are ninety-four federal judicial districts in the United States and one United States
Attorney for each judicial district. From a geographical standpoint, the largest federal judicial districts are, in descending order, the Districts of Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada.
The states of Arizona, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and South Dakota are each comprised of a
single statewide federal judicial district and each includes substantial Indian country jurisdiction.
The United States Attorney's Office in Alaska, which has very little Indian country jurisdiction, has
approximately twenty Assistant United States Attorneys in total and a small number of support staff.
U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Alaska, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ak/info/administrative.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2005). In Arizona, in contrast, Indian country makes up nearly twenty percent
of the land mass within the state. And in contrast to the small office in Alaska, the United States
Attorney's Office in Arizona has approximately 275 employees. U.S. Attorney's Office, District of
Arizona, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
195.

See United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Reservations are often located at great distances from the principle cities
where federal courts sit.
Consider, for example, the federal District of Arizona. In Arizona, the
Navajo reservation sends more cases to the United States Attorney's Office
than all other tribes in the state combined.196 Federal trials of these cases
routinely occur in Prescott or Phoenix. As the figure below indicates, Prescott is around one hundred miles, as the crow flies, from the closest point on
the Navajo Reservation and more than two hundred miles from the heart of
that reservation. By highway, these distances are much greater.
FIGURE I
ARIZONA INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES
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Now consider the federal District of Minnesota. Though Minnesota is
somewhat smaller than Arizona, 97 the geographic reality is similar. All of
the federal Indian country offenses in Minnesota originate on two reservations, the Red Lake Reservation and the Bois Fort Reservation in the
northern part of the state. The federal criminal trials for these reservations
routinely occur in the so-called Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul,
which is where all of the federal district court judges' chambers are located.' 9' As the figure below indicates, both reservations lie a tremendous
distance from the Twin Cites, and the Red Lake reservation, which produces
the vast majority of the federal Major Crimes cases in the district, is particularly remote from major highways, making it difficult to reach.
As a result of the geographic factors and the other phenomena mentioned previously, Native Americans are poorly represented on all federal
jury panels. Because juries in Indian country cases are selected in the same
manner as all other federal criminal juries, Indians are almost never wellrepresented as jurors in Indian country cases. In that sense, they share many
of the traditional complaints of other minority communities related to the
composition of juries. 99

197.
Arizona at approximately 114,000 square miles is almost half again as large as Minnesota which encompasses less than 80,000 square miles. RAND MCNALLY & Co., THE ROAD ATLAS
'05, at 8, 54 (2005).
198. See U.S. District Court, District of Minn., http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov (last visited
Nov. 13, 2005).
199. Cf Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization,Fair Cross-Sections, and the
Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 80-81 (2004) (arguing that federal juries do not
properly represent communities in urban drug offense cases because the federal jury is drawn differently than a jury that would be drawn under state law for a state prosecution); see also Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677
(1995). Some cases have also addressed similar issues. E.g., United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp.
966, 979-80 (D. Conn. 1992) (defendant's challenge to a jury venire that excluded jurors from two
of the most populous and most minority-dense cities from the venire).
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MINNESOTA INDIAN RESERVATIONS UNDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION

D. Legal Challenges
Drawing upon the legal principles set forth in Duren v. Missouri, defendants in Indian country cases have challenged jury pool composition in a

variety of circumstances as being underrepresentative of Native Americans.2

°

200. Cf United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Erickson, 75
F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Haworth, 948 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.M. 1996); United States v. Pleier, 849 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Alaska
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In an early Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Clifford," ' the defendant presented evidence that Indians living within the division from which
the trial jury was selected constituted 15.6% of the total populace, but that
only 8.4% of the jurors who served during a two-year period were Indian.
This evidence demonstrated an "absolute disparity" (the difference between the figures) of 7.2% and a "comparative disparity" of 46%.' o' In
other words, each jury had, on average, 46% fewer Indians than it would
have had if its composition matched the representation of Indians in the
general population.
Following an analysis that generally tracked the three-step Duren ap203
proach, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Indians are a "distinctive
group" that should be represented in a fair cross-section of the community. 2 4 However, the Eighth Circuit held that the underrepresentation failed
Duren's second factor, which asks whether the group's representation is
"fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. '' 2°' The court held that the disparity established by the evidence
was not substantial enough as a matter of law to constitute a violation of
the JSSA or the Sixth Amendment. 20 6 Accordingly, the defendant was unable to establish a prima facie violation and was unable even to reach the
third step of showing that the underrepresentation was due to "systematic
exclusion." Since that time,
other challenges in the Eighth Circuit have
27
been equally unsuccessful.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue at about the same time and
reached a similar result. In United States v. Yazzie, 208 an Indian defendant
presented evidence that the proportion of Indians in the grand jury was 45%
lower than the proportion of Indians over age eighteen in the general population of the state. 20 9 The defendant also presented evidence that the
proportion of jurors on the petit jury was 46% lower than the proportion of
Indians in the general population over age eighteen in the division from
which the jury was drawn. 20° The Tenth Circuit in Yazzie, like the Eighth
Circuit in Clifford, held that such disparities were not substantial enough to
1994). Because this Article is directed at cases prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act and not
general federal laws, this Article will focus on cases that present the issue in Indian country.
201.

640 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1981).

202.

Clifford, 640 F.2d at 154-55.

203.

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

204.

Clifford, 640 F.2d at 154-55.

205.

Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

206.

Id. at 155-56.

207. See United States v. Greatwalker, 356 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ireland
62 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v.Black Bear, 878 F2d 213 (8th Cir. 1989); Peltier v. United States, 867 F.2d 1125 (8th Cir.
1989).
208.

660 F2d 422 (10th Cir. 1981).

209.

Yazzie, 660 F.2d at 427.

210.

Id.

February 2006]

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

demonstrate that the venire was "not [a] fair and reasonable" representation
of the community. 21' Just as in the Eighth Circuit, no Indian country defendant in the Tenth
S• 212 Circuit has ever successfully challenged jury composition
on such a basis.
The issue has also arisen regularly in the Ninth Circuit. In United States
v. Etsitty,2 3 a Navajo defendant challenged the transfer of a jury trial from
the District of Arizona's Prescott Division of the court to the Phoenix Division on the basis that the transfer "deprived him of a jury venire that
reflected the large percentage of Indians in the Prescott Division.' 2' 4 According to the court, the crimes occurred "within the territory of the Prescott
Division," and the Prescott Division "contains several Indian reservations,
and consequently a far higher percentage of Native Americans than the
Phoenix Division. 25 The Ninth Circuit noted that judges have tremendous
discretion to transfer cases within the district and that the jury selection
• 216 plan
in the Phoenix Division fairly represents that division's population. Despite the fact that the court had a local rule providing that all cases arising in
either the Prescott or Phoenix Division would be tried in Phoenix, the court
held that the defendant had not presented sufficient evidence of a systematic
transfer of cases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Division resulting in the exclusion of Indian jurors because the defendant failed to
217
establish that the local rule was applied. However, the court noted that the
systematic removal of cases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Division would present a strong case for finding a systematic exclusion of
Indians under Duren v Missouri.2 " Thus, the court indicated that such a
219
practice, if established, would amount to an abuse of discretion.
Given the clear language in Etsitty, it was not long before the issue arose
again 220
in a case with a stronger evidentiary record. In United States v. Footracer, the district court had transferred the Navajo defendant's trial from
Prescott to Phoenix; the district court then denied the defendant's motion to
move the trial back to Prescott. The defendant argued on appeal that the
transfer of his case from Prescott to Phoenix denied
. 221 him a jury panel composed of a fair cross section of the community. He presented evidence
indicating that Native Americans constituted 20.78% of the population over

211.

Id.

212.

See, e.g., United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983).

213. United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 140 E3d 1274 (9th
Cir. 1997).
214.

Etsitty, 130 F.3d at 424.

215.

Id. at424-25.

216.

Id. at 425.

217.

Id. at425-26.

218.

Id.

219.

Id. at425.

220.

189 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).

221.

Footracer, 189 F.3d at 1060.
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the age of eighteen in the Prescott Division, but only 1.73% of the popula22
tion over the age of eighteen in the Phoenix Division. The Ninth Circuit
once again found that the third prong of Duren was not met. 223 The court
departed, however, from the approach it had used in Etsitty and characterized the key language in that case as dictum. Instead, it held that there was
no systematic exclusion of Indians from the jury venire because the move
from Prescott to Phoenix systematically excluded all residents of the Prescott Division, not just Indians: "Native Americans are not treated differently;
they are excluded to the
224 same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in
the Prescott Division."
A vigorous dissent by Judge Pregerson excoriated the majority for ignoring its warning in Etsitty and for "importing the equal protection concept
of discriminatory intent into what is a straightforward Sixth Amendment fair
cross-section challenge., 225 A petition for rehearing was filed and the opinion was withdrawn almost two years later.2 26 Meanwhile, shortly after
Etistty, the federal district court in Arizona amended its local rules to pro227
vide that cases arising in the Prescott Division will be tried in Prescott.
The rule change presumably prevents a repeat of the issue in that district.
The "fair cross-section" issue arose again the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Bushyhead.2" The defendant, an Indian prosecuted for a murder on
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Reservation in northern Nevada, argued that his
conviction should be reversed because he was denied a panel constituting a
"fair cross-section" of the community; the jury selection plan in the District
of Nevada drew only from county voting lists and not from tribal voting
lists. 229 The Ninth Circuit rejected Bushyhead's argument. The JSSA generally authorizes the district court to select the political subdivisions from
which it will obtain voting lists. 21° It seems to allow, but does not require, the
district court to select among other appropriate subdivisions of government
from which it will draw lists. 23 The Ninth Circuit noted that people living on
reservations in Nevada also live within Nevada counties and thus are not
purposefully excluded from the county voting lists; they may register for

222.

Id. at 1066 n. I (Pregerson, J., dissenting).

223.

Id. at 1061-62.

224.

Id.

225.

Id. at 1067 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).

226. Footracer, 252 F.3d 1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001). The opinion was replaced with an unpublished memorandum disposition that rejected the defendant's arguments with little analysis. United
States v. Footracer, 16 F App'x 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished op.). The withdawal of
the opinion surely reflects problems with the court's original analysis of this issue.
227. Rules of Practice of the U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ. 1.1 (c) (2003) (rule relocated to 77. 1(c) in 2004).
228.

United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F3d 905,907 (9th Cir. 2001).

229.

Id. at 909.

230.

Id. at 910; see 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2000).

231.

28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
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elections like any other citizens within those counties.232 Therefore, the court
held that Bushyhead could not establish that the jury selection plan was not
fair or reasonable under Duren's second prong or that it caused "systematic
exclusion" of Native Americans under the third prong. 2" Thus, the Ninth
Circuit joins the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in never having entertained a
successful challenge by an Indian to an Indian country prosecution for lack
of a jury constituting a "fair cross-section" of the community. Together these
three circuits make up the vast majority of Indian country jurisdiction in the
United States.
E. A Critiqueof Jury Composition Cases in Indian Country
In each of the challenges discussed above, the parties argued that the
jury pools failed to constitute representative cross-sections of the community because they excluded Native Americans. 234 The parties and the courts
have made three general types of analytical errors in these cases.
1. Representativeness and a Jury of One's Peers
First, in using the standard developed in Duren v. Missouri, the courts
and the litigants have lost sight of one of the original principles that animated Strauder: "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates,
persons having the
23 5
same legal status in society as that which he holds."
In Indian country cases, obtaining jurors from the entire district results
in using jurors from outside the Indian country jurisdiction of the court. Although neither the Constitution nor the Sixth Amendment use the term
"peers," the Supreme Court has, from time to time indicated that the right to
trial by jury means a right to a jury of one's peers.236 Since the term is not
explicitly constitutional, it has never been effectively defined, at least for
federal purposes. 2" However, the Court has suggested that the term is implicit within the definition of jury and that the term means to include only
those persons with the same legal status as the defendant, those who live

232.

Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 910.

233.

Id. at 909-10.

234. See, e.g., id. at 907; United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F2d 422, 426-28 (10th Cir.
1981) (finding no underrepresentation of Indians on jury venires); cf United States v. Raszkiewicz,
169 F.3d 459, 462-67 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting non-Indian defendant's claim in a federal bank
robbery case that the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community because, though it
included "urban Indians," it did not include "reservation Indians").
235.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,308 (1880) (emphasis added).

236. See id.; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,411 (1972); see also Massaro, supra note 146,
at 548 ("Although the United States Constitution makes no mention of 'peers,' most people believe
the Constitution entitles them to a 'jury of their peers."').
237.

See Massaro, supra note 146, at 548-50.
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within the reach of the same laws. 231 Since no off-reservation person can
be prosecuted for an Indian country offense unless he ventures into Indian
country and commits a crime, the average juror in an Indian country case
is simply not in any practical sense a "peer" to the defendant in the case. 239
Such a scheme is thus arguably contrary to the broader principle enunciated in Strauder that a person should be judged by persons subject to the
same laws.24 °
2. Consideringthe Indian Law Context of These Cases
Litigants and the courts have also failed to give proper consideration to
the Indian law context of these cases. As the Supreme Court recognized

when it first upheld the Major Crimes Act, "[Indians] owe no allegiance to
the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest

enemies., 24' Given that one of the justifications for the Indian country crimi-

nal justice regime is the federal government's duty of protection toward
Indians and, often, as against state authority (and state authorities), how can
state voter registration lists be the appropriate resources for creating a jury
pool? In other words, why should federal courts look to the people whom
the Supreme Court once described as the Indians' "deadliest enemies" to

construct a jury pool that is impartial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment?
Viewed in this light, the defendant's argument in Bushyhead was, in

many ways, the most insightful. The facts supporting this case were far
stronger than the Ninth Circuit recognized. In general, although
the partici• 241
pation of Indians in state elections seems to be growing, Indians can be
expected to be far more invested in their tribal governments than in state
governments. On Indian reservations, tribal governments are often more
salient than state governments. Tribal governments often provide numerous
services, such as medical and dental care, social services, schools and education, and law enforcement. In other words, the existence of tribal
238.

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.

239. For a discussion about the importance of the inclusion of peers on a jury, see Massaro,
supra note 146, at 552. Massaro finds that "[t]he idea behind the peer concept... is to assure empathy, not sympathy, for the accused. Empathy in this sense means the capacity for participating in or

vicariously experiencing another's feelings, volitions, or ideas. It is a form of understanding." Id.
She continues, "A jury that includes the defendant's peers-people who are able to identify with the
defendant and his experiences-may view the prosecution's case very differently than would a jury
of people who are merely 'impartial' or who are peers of the alleged victim." Id.
240. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's assertion in United States v. Footracerthat "Native Americans
are... excluded [only] to the same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in the Prescott Division," 189 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001), harkens back
to Justice Field's dissent in Strauder, which plaintively explained that the black defendant in that
case received a fair jury because he received exactly the same type of jury (twelve white males) that
any white defendant received. Sirauder, 100 U.S. at 312 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing his own dissent in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349-70 (1880)). Such an approach thus seems patently
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the majority opinion in Strauder.
241.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).

242.

See generall, LaVelle, supra note 96.
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governments tends to undermine the importance of local and state governments. Tribal governments tend to provide even more services than state and
local governments routinely provide to their own constituents. It is only
natural that Indians have greater interest in their governments than in state
governmental institutions. Thus, tribal citizens may not have as much reason
to participate in state elections and voting.
While one might criticize Indians for "opting out" of their right to participate in the state electoral processes, the Indian country criminal justice
regime implicitly condones the notion that Indians need not participate in
state electoral politics. Indeed, federal law creates criminal jurisdiction that
is exclusively federal and tribal and thus serves to shield Indians from the
influence of state officials. Under such circumstances, Indians might be expected to opt out of state and local elections for officials who have little or
no impact on their lives. The Major Crimes Act and other federal laws like it
are designed to preserve a separate existence for Indian tribes. Indeed, they
presume to preserve each tribe's right to remain alienated from the state
body politic. To some degree, the very purpose of an Indian reservation is to
provide a refuge from state governments.24' Given this underlying rationale
for Indian reservations, it is curious that federal courts would look to state
voter rolls to find jurors. It undermines the very nature of a reservation as a
sanctuary from state authority.
3. Focusing on "The Community"
Perhaps the most important error that the litigants and courts have made
in these cases, however, is failing to use the basic theory of Duren properly
by failing to focus on the proper legal principles. In focusing on "fair crosssection," each of these challenges has simply argued the wrong point. Attempting to achieve "a fair cross-section of the community" begs the most
important question: what community?
While the routine approach to jury selection may be legitimate in the
context of general federal criminal laws, the Indian country laws are not
federal laws of general applicability with nationwide application. Indian
country prosecutions are not brought to protect the national "community."
They are brought to protect the Indian reservation community. Thus, a jury
pool that represents a fair cross-section of the judicial district or a division
thereof will not constitute a cross-section, fair or otherwise, of the Indian
country community. And it is only the existence of the crime within the Indian country community that justifies federal jurisdiction.
In Clifford, Etsitty, Yazzie, and even to some degree in Bushyhead, the
defendants tried to shoehorn otherwise strong arguments into the wrong
portion of the reasoning of Duren v. Missouri. In insuring a fair crosssection of the community on the jury panel, Duren v. Missouri sought not to

243. Cf Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 (1976) (explaining that not even Public
Law 280 was intended "to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws and state
taxation").
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seek diversity for diversity's sake, but sought to ensure representativeness
of the community so as to protect the community's central role in criminal
justice."4
While Duren was attempting to protect the important role of the community, it may have seemed to be doing so in a manner that ensured
antidiscrimination and even racial integration of the legal process. But
"antidiscrimination" and integration principles are not the appropriate norms
for addressing a legal regime affecting Indians in Indian country. The underlying justification for a separate Indian country regime is preservation of the
tribal right to remain separate and to avoid integration. In other words,
discrimination, or at least separatism, is a positive normative principle in
Indian law, not a negative one, and not one in favor of Indians as a race but
in favor of tribes as distinct political organizations that have a right to con246
tinue to exist and exercise self-governance and self-determination. In that
sense, the litigants and courts should look to the deeper intention of Duren v.
Missouri, which was to ensure that a community is well-represented in its
criminal justice regime.247
To frame the overarching problem in a slightly different way, jury panels
in federal Indian country cases are not underinclusive because they fail to
include adequate numbers of Native Americans but rather overinclusive because they include persons who do not live in Indian country and are not
routinely subject to federal Indian country jurisdiction. The composition of
Indian country juries is thus akin in the non-Indian context to using a statewide jury pool to adjudicate a local crime. Not only is such an approach
difficult to justify as matter of criminal justice practice, it would violate
state constitutions in many states.1' A proper analysis thus involves a more
careful and explicit examination of the word "community."
The "fair cross-section of the community" rhetoric grows from the Sixth
Amendment's interest in creating an "impartial jury." Federal courts have
tended to construe "community" as the entire judicial district in which the
249
offense occurred or as a division, which is a smaller subunit of the district.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that defining commu-

244.

See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1979).

245. Reservations exist in the United States to preserve for Indians and Indian tribes a right to
what Professor Wilkinson has called a "measured separatism," a sanctuary where they are shielded
from the authority of state actors. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE
LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN

A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

113 (1987).

246. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S.
641, 646 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
247.

See supra note 160.

248. Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line Criminal
Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 271, 272-333 (2005) (discussing state common-law principles
and state constitutional provisions on trials by jury of the vicinage).
249. See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (holding that the
term "community" is a term of art that refers to the total populace of the district or division where
the court convenes). The Jury Selection and Service Act implicitly assumes such a construction. See

28 U.S.C. § 1869(e) (2000).
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nity is, to some degree, an exercise in existentialism: "[c]ommunities differ
at different times and places. '25 ° But rather than creating fair cross-sections
of the communities served by and subject to the Indian country legal regime,
the courts have ensured only that the federal juries represent cross-sections
of far different communities.
In future cases, defendants should make the straightforward argument
that jurors in Indian country cases cannot be drawn from addresses outside
Indian country because "Indian country" is the community that the law is
designed to protect.
Even under the crabbed approach that the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have used in construing Duren, Indian country defendants ought to be
able to make better arguments than they have presented in past cases. Indian
defendants have made a critical error in presenting to the court statistics describing the entire district or division in which the court sits. The language
of Duren recognizes that statewide figures are not always the relevant
ones. 25 While statistical numbers might be difficult to obtain, the community of reference for an Indian country case surely can be no greater than the
geographical community that is subject to the Indian country laws. Thus,
defendants and defense attorneys should begin their analyses with very different statistics than have been presented in the past. Specifically, the
beginning point for demonstrating disparity should be the number of Indians
within Indian country communities, for it is only these communities that are
within the Indian country jurisdiction of the court. Given that Indians represent large majorities on Indian reservations, it should be easy to establish
substantial absolute disparities and extremely large comparative disparities
between their representation in the relevant population and their representation on jury venires and juries, especially in jurisdictions that hold trials in
locations at great distances from the Indian reservations.
To evaluate this argument in a real context, consider the federal district
of Arizona. Arizona's federal judicial district is divided into three divisions,
the Prescott Division, the Phoenix Division, and the Tucson Division. Offenses arising in the Prescott Division are, theoretically, set for trial in the
Prescott Division. And jurors for trials in the Prescott Division are drawn
from the five northern Arizona counties that make up the Prescott Division.
The Arizona portion of the Navajo Nation lies wholly within the Prescott
Division and, according to the 2000 Census, has a little more than 100,000
people. 25' A county-by-county survey of the five counties that make up the

250.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).

251.
Duren seems to concede that the community of reference is "this community," that is, the
one in which the crime occurred. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1979). It further
looked to the statistical data for Jackson County, which represents the jurisdiction of the state district court in that case. Id.
252.

The actual number was 104,565. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED ECO2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND OFFRESERVATION TRUST LAND (AZ PART) 3 (2000), available at http://www.indianaffairs.state.az.us/
tribes/Navajo.pdf.
NOMIC

CHARACTERISTICS:
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Prescott Division reveals that the Division, as a whole, encompasses almost
650,000 people.253
FIGURE 3
ARIZONA INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES

0 25 50
I I I I I

100 Miles
I

Even assuming that Navajo reservation residents were as well represented as those outside the reservation in the country rolls used to construct
the jury pool, the average jury would be composed of jurors drawn overwhelmingly from outside Indian country. As a result, the Indian country
253. See U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, Frequently Asked Questions (Aug. 8, 2005),
http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/azd/courtinfo.nsf/court/faqs?opendocument; Arizona State & County
QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov.qfd/states/040O0.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2005).
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community is only weakly represented, if at all, in the jury pool. As a
practical matter, jury trials that are originally set for trial in Prescott are
quite often moved to Phoenix, which draws its jurors from the Phoenix
Division. The Phoenix Division has a smaller Indian country land base and
an enormous metropolitan population, almost all of which is outside of
Indian country. Based on the demographic numbers alone, it is likely that
most juries hearing Indian country cases in Phoenix lack a single Indian
country resident. Such a jury simply cannot be fairly said to "represent"
that community.
The moral force behind the principle of community representativeness is
strong and, perhaps ironically, even the Navajo Nation tribal courts have
adopted it. 21 4 In Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court affirmed a jury selection process in which a tribal court clerk created
the jury venire by selecting names from the Navajo Nation voter rolls (all of
which are tribal members) and also selecting a series of names that did not
appear to be Navajo from the county voter registration rolls (which might
well include tribal members, or nonmember Indians or non-Indians).255
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court recognized that tribal courts have
unique problems selecting juries under such an approach; non-Indians may
not feel compelled to appear when summoned for tribal jury duty.256 Moreover, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's adoption of the fair cross-section
requirement does not appear to be compelled by the federal Indian Civil
257
Rights Act. Indeed, although that Act guarantees right to a jury trial that is
in other respects somewhat broader than the right to jury trial set forth in the
258
federal Constitution, the statute actually omits the requirement for an "impartial" jury,
•
259which is the constitutional hook for the "fair cross-section"
requirement. The intentional omission of the requirement of an "impartial" jury may well have been intended to prevent tribal courts from being
forced to go outside their own membership rolls to find jurors. In other
words, the Navajo Nation courts provide a "fair cross-section" right to defendants of the tribe's own accord even though it is not required by federal
law. This is some indication of the esteem in which the tribal jurisdiction
with the single largest swath of Indian country feels about the principle, a
fact that ought to be relevant to federal policymakers.

254.

See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).

255.

Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, N.L.R. Supp. 285 (Navajo 1991).

256.

Id. at 286.

257.

25 U.S.C. § 1302.

258. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10). This Act requires tribes to provide juries to anyone accused of
an offense punishable by imprisonment. The federal Constitution only recognizes such a right for
persons subject to a term of imprisonment for "serious offenses," which primarily refers to non-petty
offenses, or those offenses which carry a prison term of greater than six months. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
259. As is its style, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court did not acknowledge the Indian Civil
Rights Act in its opinion and chose to apply the principle on its own accord. MacDonald, N.L.R.
Supp 285 (Navajo 1991).
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In short, federal courts have erred in construing the relevant community
as the entire judicial district, rather than considering which community the
law seeks to protect. The Major Crimes Act and General Crime Act apply
only within "Indian country" as that space is carefully defined in the United
States Code.' 60 Indian country is an area in which the primary local governmental entity-the Indian tribe-has been stripped of its own authority to
prosecute and adjudicate felony offenses. Against this backdrop, these laws
thus provide courts with clear direction as to which community these laws
are designed to protect. While the word "community" may be ambiguous in
the Sixth Amendment, in the JSSA, and even in Supreme Court doctrine,
any ambiguity about the word in the Indian country context is erased by the
explicit definitions of Indian country in federal law. Indeed, the federal district courts would lack jurisdiction to prosecute most Indian country cases
crimes if they had not arisen in Indian country.
The crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act are serious but routine
offenses of a local nature with significant local effects and few effects beyond the locality. Yet most federal juries are unlikely to include a single
representative from the local Indian community where the offense occurred
and likely will not even include a single person who lives within Indian
country. If the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury that is fairly representative of the community arises from the theory that the jury exists to
ensure that the affected community
plays a role in the provision of criminal
• 261
justice within that community, then these purposes fail miserably in Indian
country prosecutions. Because a federal jury is not composed of members of
Indian reservation communities, it cannot claim to represent the Indian
communities where major crimes occur. Thus, such juries do not ensure the
legitimacy of criminal verdicts.
4. PracticalEffects of These Errors

While such convictions are thus illegitimate as a formal matter, serious
pragmatic ramifications follow from the errors in composing federal juries.
First, actual substantive errors may well creep into verdicts. Substantive
criminal law is replete with statutory language that calls for interpretations
of language by the local community, through the jury, in adjudicating crime.
For example, some crimes and defenses hinge on whether an action or perception was "reasonable.'2 62 The word "reasonable" is inherently subject to
context and cultural norms. It is, to a large degree, an empty vessel that
260.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).

261.
See Massaro, supra note 146, at 546 ("One function of the jury, although not the only
function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system by injecting representative community voices and values into the decision process.").
262. For example, the doctrine of self-defense uses the concept of reasonableness in numerous contexts. A common statement of the rule of self-defense, for example, is that one is privileged
to use "reasonable" force against an adversary if one "reasonably" believes that he is in danger and
that such force is necessary to avoid the danger. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (4th ed.
2003).

February 2006]

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

lawmakers and courts intentionally leave empty to be filled by jurors in any
given case. In other words, the jury is the carrier of cultural norms of what is
reasonable in any given community. A jury that is not representative of the
community may well provide the wrong definition of the word "reasonable,"
and thereby reach an erroneous verdict. Given the open texture inherent in
language and the peculiar role of juries in providing meaning in different
contexts, it is possible for such errors to occur in a variety of contexts in
criminal adjudications.
Second, consider a practical, but even more fundamental problem. The
impact and the importance of any single criminal conviction lies in its
broader meaning. Each conviction derives its normative force from what
criminal law theorist Henry Hart called the "moral condemnation of the
community."263 Indeed, expression of the moral condemnation of the community is one of the most profound purposes of the criminal justice
system. Since, in Indian country cases, the defendant's community is absent, a convicted Indian country defendant is not likely to feel the weight
of the condemnation of his own community. He is thus much less likely to
feel the moral weight of the verdict. That weight, which causes the defendant to feel shame, is a powerful force driving the rehabilitative effects of
criminal justice. 264 Absent shame, one of the core purposes of punishment
will not be met.
Jurors from outside Indian country may be in some senses "impartial" as
jurors, but they may very well be entirely uninterested. While such a jury
might be able to perform adequately the simple task of measuring the evidence against an objective legal standard, we use juries for much more
sophisticated reasons. After all, a judge could perform the same task and yet
the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that a judge is not adequate to the
task.16 ' A jury not representative of the community is no better than a
judge. 6 It cannot be said to be serving any of the other important values
that the Supreme Court has discussed in dozens of cases cited above. Such a
jury is not "representative of the community" or "fairly representative of the
268
local population" as Taylor v. Louisiana267 says a jury must be.
263. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law,
1958, at 401,406 (1958).

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer

264. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1901 (1991) (describing the sheer power of the emotion of shame which "strikes at the center of
human personality" and "forces a downward redefinition of oneself"). To perhaps oversimplify,
Professor Massaro is critical of modem efforts to leverage the shaming capabilities of criminal law
precisely because shame is too powerful to be used in a humane manner. It is inherent in every
criminal case.
265.

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

266. And the ramifications are real. A judge sitting as a finder of fact in a bench trial decides
cases differently than a jury. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Qualiy of Justice in
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1I11, 1161-69 (2003).
267.

419 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1975).

268. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990), Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
noted that though the jury panel or venire must be representative of the community, it is to be ex-
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We might also question whether such juries are actually impartial. Ka-

gama's admonition that citizens of the states in which the Indian
reservations are located are "often [the Indians'] deadliest enemies ' ' 169 may
seem archaic and obsolete."O But while the relative "deadliness" of state
citizens undoubtedly has declined to some degree since the Major Crimes
Act was enacted in the 1880s, state citizens may not have the Indian country
communities' best interests at heart. Racism and bias remain strong, particu-

larly in states where Indians compete with non-Indians for limited
resources." ' Accordingly, juries drawn broadly from outside Indian reserva-

tions may not be "impartial" when an Indian is a defendant."'
In summary, the regular federal jury selection process simply does not
allow the jury to serve its fundamental purpose in Indian country cases.
These juries are not representative of the community that is targeted or af-

fected by the federal Indian country criminal justice regime. Neither
Congress nor the courts have ever addressed this fundamental incoherence
in the composition of juries in the Indian country criminal justice system.
Because the jury's chief importance in American criminal justice is to give
the community a role and because that role is crucial to the system's legitimacy, the verdicts produced through the existing jury process are not
legitimate. The legacy of colonization is present in each of them.

IV. PUBLIC ACCESS,

VENUE, AND PUBLIC TRIALS

Closely related to the jury composition problems in Indian country cases
is a related set of issues in the constitutional doctrines of publicity and
venue. While jury composition principles address which community decides

pected that representativeness will be diminished through peremptory strikes as the panel is reduced
to an actual jury. Though representativeness will inevitably decrease, the jury's ability to judge the
case impartially will increase. Id.
269.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).

270. All Indians now have a right to be state citizens and to vote in state elections. Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (now codified as part of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401).
271.
THOMAS BIOLSI, "DEADLIEST ENEMIES": LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE RELATIONS
ON AND OFF ROSEBUD RESERVATION 2 (2001) (surveying the circumstances in South Dakota and
finding "antagonism between reservation Indians and the surrounding populations does persist");
see Clinton, supra note 20, at 521 n.88; (asserting that juries in communities immediately adjacent
to Indian reservations are likely to be more hostile to an Indian defendant, due to common racial
prejudice, than a federal jury drawn from a broader cross-section of the population); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical
State of American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV. 113, 145 (2002) (noting that the statement in
Kagama "is still true to some extent"); see also King, supra note 167, at 77 ("[J]urors, like all of us,
are influenced by stereotypes about racial groups and members of racial groups. Negative racial
stereotypes produce a 'reverse halo effect': members of negatively stereotyped groups are assumed
to possess negative traits, and positive information about them is devalued."); cf. Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 566-67 (1983) (recognizing that there is "a good deal
of force" to the argument that "[s]tate courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights"). See generally
ELIZABETH COOK-LYNN, ANTI-INDIANISM IN MODERN AMERICA (2001).
272. Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2148 (citing "the prejudices of the jury pool" as one of the
problems in a trial for a Navajo defendant being tried in state court for an off-reservation offense).
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a case by focusing on which community comprises the jury, the venue provisions address which community hosts the trial.
In recent years, transfers of venue in several high profile cases, including the trial of the Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King and
the New York City police officers who killed Amadou Diallo, have been the
subject of scathing academic and public commentary.2 73 Such transfers raise
concerns not only with regard to the racial composition of the juries in the

new venue of transfer, but also a more serious problem-the preclusion of
the affected community from participating in and witnessing the trial. But
while the King and Diallo trials were extraordinary and received tremendous
public attention, Indian country trials are always handled outside of Indian

country. Thus, all Indian country cases are subject to the same basic flaws
that spawned extensive criticism in these two extraordinary cases.
This Part will address two types of issues that merit concerns for both
defendants and communities in every Indian country case. First, it will discuss the defendant's and the public's right to access the trial. It will then

273. For criticism of the venue transfer decision in the King case, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
How Could the King Jury Do That?, LEGAL TIMES, May 11, 1992, at 23 ("However wellintentioned, the decision to change venue was highly questionable. The shift from Los Angeles to
Simi Valley produced a significantly different demographic composition for the jury pool. Los Angeles is ethnically and economically diverse. Simi Valley is virtually all white and suburban.");
David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 863, 883 (2001) ("Had
the case been tried in central Los Angeles, before a jury comprised, at least in part, of poor African
Americans or others with similar life experiences, the defense argument that the police were reacting to a combative, potentially dangerous suspect almost certainly would have fallen on deaf ears. It
would not have been difficult for jurors chosen from an inner city community to believe what their
eyes were telling them-that the police officers brutally and unnecessarily beat an African American
man who had committed no serious crime."); David Margolick, Switching Case to White Suburb
May Have Decided Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A20 ("In fact, however, the outcome of
the case may well have been decided when Judge Stanley Weisberg of California Superior Court
transferred the case from the city to Simi Valley, an overwhelmingly white, conservative enclave that
is the home of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library."); Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the "Rodney King" Case: An InterestAnalysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 215,
216 (2003) ("Soon after the verdict some legal observers suggested that an earlier decision to order
a change of venue from urban Los Angeles to the suburban community of Simi Valley was the critical feature in the acquittal." (footnote omitted)). Similar disapproval surrounded the Diallo case in
1999. See Engel, supra note 149, at 1665 ("Recognizing that Los Angeles jurors are not Simi Valley
jurors, nor Albany jurors Bronx jurors, leads to the conclusion that, before transferring a case, courts
first must try to solve the problem of prejudice against the defendant in the original venue."); Josh
Getlin, Cop Trial's Move Roils New York, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at Al ("Judges 'made demographics destiny,' said Newfield, suggesting the court should have tried to find impartial jurors
before moving the case. Now, he said, 'they have put New York on a path toward Simi Valley and
Rodney King.'"); Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Whitewash in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at
A23, ("The problem is that the five Appellate Division judges who ordered the change of venue
went out of their way to shift the case to an almost lily-white comfort zone for the officers. The
judges stomped all over the appearance of fairness when they deliberately placed the case out of the
reach of black New Yorkers, who the judges seem to feel are by reason of their color incapable of
considering the evidence in the case and rendering a fair verdict."); Editorial, The Wrong Venue,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at A22 ("The decision by a state appellate court to move the criminal
trial of four New York City police officers charged with the killing of Amadou Diallo to Albany
County seems unjustified. The accused officers are presumed innocent and deserve a fair and impartial trial, but there is no evidence that the people of the Bronx and New York City cannot be trusted
with this trial. Moving the trial to Albany, a predominantly white area, could lessen the respect with
which many residents of New York City view the verdict.").
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discuss the issue of location of the trial, including the venue provisions and
the implicit constitutional principle of vicinage. 274
A. Rights of PublicAccess to Criminal Trials
Public access or publicity for criminal trials is guaranteed by two separate
constitutional provisions. The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant's right
to a public trial on the theory that the public will provide safeguards to corruption or oppression by government officials. The First Amendment creates a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials for general members of the
public who are not parties to the case. 2" The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of public access in criminal trials. While the federal Indian country criminal justice regime may pose few formal barriers to
public access, the regime creates substantial de facto barriers that prohibit
meaningful public access to criminal trials and thus may violate the constitutional rights of both the defendant and the Indian country community.
1. The Source and Rationalefor the Right to
Public Trials and Public Access
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the defendant's right to a
public trial: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . .,27' This provision protects the defendant in
myriad ways. First and foremost, it "has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution.' 7 According to the Court, "contemporaneous review [of judicial action] in the court of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power."27 Open proceedings-and publicity-also improve
the quality of justice that the defendant receives by encouraging witness
honesty and conscientiousness and sometimes providing an opportunity for
unknown witnesses to come forward.279
However, the defendant is not the only player in the criminal justice
scheme with important interests protected by public access. While the Supreme Court has refused to hold that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
protects the public, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court
274. For those not familiar with the term, vicinage means simply "neighborhood." It is associated with a right at common law to be tried within the neighborhood or county where the crime
occurred. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1567 (6th ed. 1990).
275.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982).

276.

U.S. CONST. amend VI.

277. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 270 (1948)).
278.

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270-71.

279.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.

280.

See id. at 383-84.

281.

448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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did recognize a right emanating from the First Amendment that protects the
public's right of access to criminal trials. As a result, a First Amendment
right, possessed not by the defendant but by the public, has an equally significant role and also serves many important purposes. Cumulatively, the
cases dealing with the defendant's Sixth Amendment public trial rights and
the public's First Amendment rights to open access to trials produce literally
dozens of justifications for the important role that public access plays.
Some justifications are as broad as the usual justifications for open government: public scrutiny has beneficial effects for any governmental
282
function, 28and
the public must be able to see the government's work to
3

evaluate it.

Many of the justifications are highly specific to the criminal trial process. The right of public access is often justified, for example, by utilitarian
philosophy about the operation of the justice system. The Supreme Court
has held that "public access to criminal trials... is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.''284The Court has cited the writings of Hale and Blackstone and cited approvingly of Jeremy Bentham's
recognition that, beginning centuries ago, "open proceedings enhanced the
performance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public."285
Some of the justifications are not merely utilitarian, but normative:
"[P]ublic proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for their
criminal conduct .. 286 The public has a "definite and concrete interest in
seeing that justice is swiftly and fairly administered. 287 And some of the
justifications are both utilitarian and normative. The Court has borrowed
from Bentham the notion that trials have "significant community therapeutic
value" that is served only with open access to trials:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion.... The crucial prophylactic aspects of the
administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is done in a comer or in a covert manner. [And]
results alone will not satiate the natural community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and

282.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 412 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).

283. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1984) [hereinafter
Press-EnterpriseI]; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (Stevens J.,
dissenting) [hereinafter Press-EnterpriseII]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982) (finding a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials designed to protect
free discussion of government affairs).
284.

Press-Enterprise11,
478 U.S. at 12.

285.

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 & n.7.

286.

Id. at 509.

287.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.
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where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst
has been corrupted.2 8
The Court has also explained that without access, the community will not
understand the system in general or its particular workings in a specific
case, and it is difficult for a community to accept what it cannot observe. 2 9
In sum, the First and Sixth Amendments protect different sorts of interests. Whether viewed from the public's perspective or the defendant's,
however, public access is fundamental to the purposes of criminal trials.
Without it, the defendant is denied key safeguards and the community is
denied key participatory interests, not the least of which are peace of mind,
catharsis, and closure. Without access to the trial by the interested community, neither the defendant's interests nor the public's interests are served.
2. PublicAccess and Indian Country Defendants
As explained above, trials for local offenses in Indian country routinely
occur more than a hundred miles away from the communities where the
crimes occurred.' 9° In light of the tremendous distances, deep poverty, and
other daily facts of life on Indian reservations, the defendants, their families,
the victims, the witnesses, and other members of the community are often
unable to attend criminal trials.'9g While there may be no formal bar to access, the federal regime's removal of the trial from the community where the
crime occurred to a distant city creates a routine, de facto denial of public
access to trials.
Consider that witnesses who appear in federal court by subpoena are
routinely reimbursed for travel expenses, provided hotel rooms, and paid
witness fees, even though the law requires them to appear.2 92 In other words,
though attendance is mandatory and absence is punishable by contempt proceedings, the federal government subsidizes their appearance. While such
payments may well be necessary to vindicate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses,
such payments seem to concede that witnesses sometimes cannot appear

288. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-571 (internal citations omitted, but citing,
among others, JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827)).
289.

Id. at 572.

290.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

291. Admittedly, some of the same arguments might be made by any federal defendant in a
large federal district. The federal districts with Indian country may be much larger than any federal
districts that the Framers might have conceived of. Of the original colonies, even Virginia and New
York are comparatively small by the standards of the Western and Midwestern states where Indian
country jurisdiction exists. For most federal offenses, there is a legitimate national interest involved
and the defendant's actions must affect national interests. Otherwise, presumably, there would be no
federal jurisdiction. As noted above, however, Indian offenses are local in nature.
292.
BEHALF

See, e.g., U.S.
OF

THE

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACT WITNESSES APPEARING ON

UNITED

STATES

GOVERNMENT,

http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/obd2.pdf.

FORM

OBD

2

(1996),

available

at
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without federal assistance. Given the poverty on Indian reservations, it is
indisputable that members of the Indian community ordinarily might also be
unable to attend federal criminal trials absent financial assistance.
Given that de facto denials of access to Indian country trials can be easily established, at least in some cases, the question is whether such
circumstances constitute effective denial of the community's First Amendment right to public access. A compelling argument can be made that they
do. While not all of the justifications for public access cited by the Court in
recent cases require access by the affected community,2 93 most of the justifications require, or, at a minimum, will be better served by, the involvement
of the specific community in which the crime occurred.
Consider first the defendant's right to a public trial as a criminal procedural safeguard. One stated justification for public trials is to ensure the
294
"integrity and quality" of the testimony offered at • trial
•
295 and to encourage
witnesses to perform their duties more conscientiously. Given those concerns, access by members of the affected community-friends and
neighbors, in other words, rather than strangers-is likely to be much more
effective in insuring witness conscientiousness and honesty. Practical experience suggests that it is harder to lie in front of friends than strangers.
Indeed, the absence of any members of the relevant community in the gallery or on the jury may embolden a witness who is prone to lie or may at
least allow the witness to be more careless with the facts. In such circumstances, the witness is not directly accountable to his own community for
the testimony he provides. The witness's community may well be entirely
unaware of the proceeding. At the same time, the cultural gulf may render
the witness less invested in and less respectful of the federal criminal justice
process. It is, of course, the defendant's own neighbors who are likely to be
most concerned about any attempt to "employ [the] courts as instruments of
persecution '' 96 against a member of their community. 97 The Supreme Court
has also justified public access on the expectation that publicity may "in' 298
duce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony.

293. As long as the trial is open at least to some portion of the public, some of the "open
government" purposes will be met. However, general members of the public cannot provide the
safeguard against governmental misconduct that members of the Indian country community could
provide. Community members are likely to have both a greater sense of the context of the govemment action and a keen incentive to conduct careful scrutiny; after all, it is their community that the
crime has affected.
294.

See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980).

295.

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).

296.

Id. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).

297. One who believes in the right of jury nullification might recognize no opportunity for the
Indian community to exercise the jury nullification power. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury
Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 912-13, 918-21 (1997) (arguing that
minority jurors should exercise the power of jury nullification to overcome their marginalization as
minorities in the political process and to serve as a political protest).
298.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.
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Certainly, this cannot be so unless the specific community in which the witnesses are located has easy access to the trial.299
3. Public Access and Indian Country Communities
Though the defendant's interests sometimes overlap with the community's, turn now from publicity as a safeguard to the defendant to consider
the public's particular interests in open access. Consider for example the
"community therapeutic" justification for public trials. Such a purpose simply cannot be served unless the affected community has access to the trial.
No other community will do. It is the affected community that will have a
"fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done. ' ° It is the affected
community that might otherwise engage in "vengeful self-help" 30 if it is not
satisfied with the process or the outcome.
Indeed, this presents another cruel irony of the existing system. Federal
officials originally justified their assertion of need for the Major Crimes Act
at least partially on the concern that absent federal trials, there would be an
unending cycle of violence because victims would naturally seek revenge
and there was no tribal forum to resolve these disputes. 302 Though that argument was dubious in context (tribes had methods of maintaining order
that had worked for centuries and this particular offense had been addressed
by the tribe in a traditional manner"'), certainly one of the purposes for a
criminal justice system is to address wrongs within formal channels to prevent informal efforts at revenge. But how can the criminal justice system
serve this purpose if the relevant community is unaware of the criminal justice system's work? 3°4 Indeed, if revenge is a serious concern, the existing
system does not address it; acts of revenge might occur in Indian country
because the community has no idea that "justice" has already been achieved.
Public access does not necessarily require actual members of the community in the courtroom. But since federal trials are not televised, they are

299. While this argument is being made in the context of trial, the requirement of public access also has been held to apply to other key stages of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States
v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (plea and sentencing hearings).
300.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).

301.

Id.

302.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

303.

See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DoG's CASE (1994).
304. In this regard, the Indian country criminal justice regime ironically fails also to meet
another of the key original purposes of the federal Major Crimes Act. One ostensible purpose of the
Major Crimes Act to involve Indians in the American criminal justice system in an effort to "civilize" and assimilate them. In debate on the Act, one member of Congress repeatedly cited the
Secretary of the Interior's arguments that such a law was needed for "civilizing the Indian race." 16
CONG. REC. 934 (1885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon). While such a purpose might be explicitly
disavowed in the current era, such a purpose could never have been served with trials held hundreds of miles from the Indian communities and without involvement from those communities.
Such trials may have helped to "assimilate" the Indian defendant who was then convicted and
served a term of imprisonment, but surely Congress did not mean to assimilate Indians one
criminal defendant at a time.
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perhaps the least friendly forums for other forms of public access. In Indian
country, it is likely that most tribal members are not even aware of distant
federal criminal trials even while they are occurring. Few Indian country
cases are covered in the popular press such as local television news programs or large daily newspapers. And while some local communities may
have weekly or monthly newspapers that serve Indian country communities,3°6 few report on federal criminal trials.
To put the real world ramifications of an Indian country prosecution in
the plain words of an Indian who served as a United States Attorney, the
federal proceedings are practically meaningless to the Indian community:
"five Indian defendants are arrested on the reservation for the assault and
robbery and taken to federal court in Rapid City. Two of them eventually
return to the reservation, but three of them don't come back; folks on the
reservation don't really know why.' 307 As a result of this lack of understanding of the federal criminal process and the particular facts of individual
trials, the existing system provides none of the of the "community therapeutic" benefits thought to be served by public trials.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly justified open access on the theory
that it enhances not only basic fairness itself, but equally importantly, the
appearanceof fairness within the judicial system. 3°' Given that the Indian
country criminal justice system has famously-and fairly-been characterized by legal scholars as a "jurisdictional maze,"3 °9 it is fair to speculate that
there may be fundamental parts of the system that are poorly understood by
the average member of an Indian community.
The simplest way to convey the Supreme Court's "legitimacy" argument
is to recognize that people are inherently suspicious of that which they do
not understand. Like the proverbial tree that falls in the forest, does a trial
that occurs hundreds of miles from the Indian community where the crime
occurred reverberate with justice or fairness? By virtue of the federal courts'
practical inaccessibility to the Indian community, federal Indian country
criminal trials fail to educate Indian communities generally about the process of federal criminal law or specifically about the facts of individual cases.
Absent involvement by the affected community, a trial cannot assure the
305.
Kara Briggs et al., The Reading Red Report, Native Americans in the News: A 2002
Report and Content Analysis on Coverage by the Largest Newspapers in the United States (2002)
(unpublished report), http://www.naja.conresources/publications/2002-reading-red.pdf (finding a
pattern of lack of coverage and uninformed coverage following a statistical analysis of the reportage
in eight of the largest American newspapers about American Indians and tribes).
306. One example is the Gallup Independent which occasionally presents articles addressing
Indian country criminal issues related to the Navajo Nation. See INDEP. (Gallup, N.M.),
http://www.gallupindependent.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
307. Discussion with Philip Hogen, former United States Attorney of South Dakota, Washington, D.C. (September 21, 2005).
308.

Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).

309. Clinton, supra note 20; Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v.
Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D.
L. REv. 433 (1996); William V. Vetter, A New Corridorfor the Maze: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
and Nonmember Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 349 (1992).
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legitimacy of the criminal justice system in general or the verdict issued in
any given case.
Perhaps most importantly, federal Indian country trials undermine the
most basic moral underpinnings of the criminal law. If a defendant does not
feel the weight of moral judgment of his own community, he may not be
confronted with his own actions in a way that would cause him to regret the
actions that gave rise to his criminal offense. This harms both the defendant
and the community and frustrates both the rehabilitative and retributive purposes of criminal law.
4. Public Trials and Self-Government
Jury trials and access to these trials by the general public are fundamentally designed to preserve public participation in government. In a lengthy
concurrence in Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court, Justice Stevens indicated that a primary mission of First Amendment was to secure meaningful
public control over the process of governance.3 0 He explained this mission
in the context of public trials:
[T]he First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican form of selfgovernment.... Our system of self-government assumes the existence of
an informed citizenry .... It follows that a claim to access cannot succeed
unless access makes a positive contribution to this process of selfgovernance. 311
The words of Justice Stevens highlight the dissonance that exists in Indian country criminal justice. If the fundamental aim of the First
Amendment protection of public access to criminal trials is to preserve the
communities control over government, that is, its self-government, then Indians and Indian tribes have been wronged twice over. First, the Indian
country criminal justice system displaced tribal governance over the most
important criminal justice issues on the reservation. It then denied the Indian
community the participatory rights that most other American communities
have in their federal criminal justice system.
B. Venue, Vicinage, and Place of Trial
The Constitution addresses concerns similar to those outlined above in
the venue provisions. The Constitution addresses the broad issue of venue
by providing that criminal trials shall be held in the state in which the crime
31233
occurred. Though this mandate, in the past, was codified in federal law,"'

310.

Press-Enterprise!,464 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., concurring).

311.

Id. at 518-19 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).

312.
313.
(1988).

U.S. CONST. art. iMi,§ 2.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1393, repealed by Pub. L. 100-702, Title X, § 1001(a), 102 Stat. 4664
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it is currently addressed in the rules of criminal procedure. Rule 18 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that generally "the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed."'3 14 It further requires the court to "set the place of trial within the
district with,,315due regard for the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses ....
The Sixth Amendment addresses a related but somewhat narrower concept of vicinage. It holds that the jury shall be drawn from the "State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."'316 According to Professor Akhil Amar, the narrow vicinage requirement in the Sixth
Amendment arose directly from concerns by the Anti-Federalists who
"wanted an explicit guarantee that juries would be organized around local
rather than statewide communities. ,3 7 As a result,3 Amar views the jury as an
"institution of localism and popular sovereignty." 18
One reason for the narrow vicinage right was to ensure that the trial was
"public" in every meaningful sense. In a world with far fewer media outlets
than today's world, Professor Amar explains, "the public trial was designed
to infuse public knowledge into the trial itself, and, in turn, to satisfy the
public that truth had prevailed. .. ,,3'9
The public trial was designed to ensure values of "democratic openness and education, public confidence,
anticorruption, and truth seeking. 320
Amar believes that the decision to use the word "district" rather than the
common law term "vicinage" in the Sixth Amendment reflects a compromise by the founders to allow a political branch to make the ultimate
decision. Thus, Congress would determine the scope of any "vicinage" right
simply by defining judicial districts. 32' Another commentator, Steven Engel,
would go farther than Amar. Engel has argued that the vicinage presumption
"inhered in the very notion of trial by jury" and was so fundamental to the
common law legal tradition that the right to a jury of the vicinage did not
need to be preserved explicitly. 322 Engel highlights the adjudicative quality
of the local jury, which is likely to be more familiar with the context of the
crime and thus less likely to convict the innocent than a jury from a different

18.
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FED. R. CRIM. P.

315.

Id.

316.

U.S.
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AMAR,supra note 138, at 105.
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Id. at 106.
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Id. at113.
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amend. VI.

321. While the right to a local jury was in some sense a safeguard for the defendant, it was not
the most protective safeguard. That approach might have been, for example, to select a jury from his
own home state. Thus, the "district" requirement represented a compromise between the competing
interests of the defendant and the community in which the crime occurred. See AMAR, supra note
138, at 81-118; see also Massaro, supra note 146, at 508 (tracing the meaning of "district" in the
Sixth Amendment).
322.

Engel, supra note 149, at 1691.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:709

community.2 He also vaunts the representative nature of the local jury,
highlighting the jury's role as the "democratic branch" of the judiciary with
the responsibility of "injecting the voice of the community into the administration of the laws. 3 24 Finally, he notes the importance of the jury acting as
the "voice" of the local community; as a result of the transfers of the King
and Diallo trials, he argues, the juries in those cases had no claim to speak
for the affected
communities and thus the verdicts were not viewed as le25
gitimate.1
Engel's argument for a vicinage right rests not just within the Sixth
Amendment, but also within the First Amendment right of access cases discussed previously as well as cases, such as Powers v. Ohio,326 which
recognize the right of individual jurors to serve on juries, or at least not to
be arbitrarily excluded.
While Engel's argument that there is an implicit constitutional vicinage
right is compelling, Indian defendants and communities do not need to convince courts to go nearly so far. Indian country communities need only to
have courts recognize a much more modest vicinage right; that is, the vicinage right should be coextensive with the court's geographical
jurisdiction. 3" For Indian country offenses under the Major Crimes Act and
the General Crimes Act, 328 the geographical jurisdiction of the court extends
only to Indian country.
Given the importance of the First and Sixth Amendments and the general importance of the jury in American criminal justice, the problems
identified above strike at the core of the Indian country criminal justice system. Whether the legal argument is presented as a right to a public trial,
public access, venue, or vicinage, trials in Indian country fail to square with
fundamental constitutional values. As a result, Indian defendants and Indian
communities are subjected to a federal criminal justice process that is of
dubious constitutional and moral legitimacy.

323.

Id. at 1693-95.

324.

Id. at 1696.

325.

Id. at 1698-99.

326. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) ("The opportunity for ordinary citizens to
participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.").
327. Even if Amar's view is correct that any constitutional vicinage right is limited by Congress's definition of district, Congress has done a curious job of defining federal judicial districts.
Consider that the State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts while the State of Arizona, a much larger and more populous state, constitutes only one judicial district. The result is that
jurors (as well as defendants, witnesses, or victims) in Oklahoma are, on average, far closer to the
federal criminal trials that arise in their communities than jurors in Arizona. Such a regime poses a
disparate burden on Indian communities in Arizona.
328. One remaining question is whether such reasoning could be extended to prosecutions in
federal enclaves, such as military bases. In those circumstances, some of the arguments are equally
compelling; however, those cases involve particular reasons for the federal jurisdiction that are
fundamentally different than Indian reservations, and the background tribal sovereignty, the notion
that there is a pre-existing sovereign that has been shunted aside, is absent.
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V. A

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF REFORM

The existing federal system has many flaws and some of these flaws are
serious. Indeed, they strike at the very heart of the legitimacy of the system.
The issues raised herein must be addressed if any meaningful reform of Indian country criminal justice is to occur. The framework for reform is,
however, not obvious.
One could read the critical analysis set forth above and make a reasonable argument that the federal Indian country criminal justice system is not
fatally flawed, but that it has strayed from its own guiding norms. Thus, one
might "reform" the existing federal system simply by steering it back to its
foundational norms and without otherwise looking outside that system.
Tremendous improvements might be achieved simply by applying existing federal norms more carefully and appropriately. For example, the
prosecutorial function should be modified so that the prosecutor executes
her responsibility in a manner consistent with the theoretical foundations for
the exercise of prosecutorial power. Likewise, jury composition should proceed in accordance with the fundamental Sixth Amendment norm of
community representativeness. It might well be possible to implement various relatively modest reforms to the existing system that would help the
federal system achieve compliance with its own norms.
Working on an approach to fixing the federal system, however, is not
necessarily the appropriate place to begin. A serious effort at reforming
criminal justice in Indian country ought also to look outside the federal system. Put another way, the reform analysis ought to begin one step prior to
evaluation and reform of the federal system. Such an effort might begin by
asking whether the federal government is the proper governmental institution to provide law enforcement and criminal justice on Indian reservations.
After all, the federal government is only one of the possible providers of
criminal justice and public safety on Indian reservations.
In the United States today, there are three different providers of criminal
justice in Indian country. In addition to the federal system, many tribal systems are involved in criminal justice, though their jurisdiction is limited to
misdemeanors.3 29 And in some states (those in which Public Law 280 or
similar laws prevail), state and local governments have criminal jurisdiction
on Indian reservations. A careful focus on reform of criminal justice in Indian country would evaluate each of these three government-types and
determine which is best suited to the important responsibility of Indian
country criminal justice. Each of the three government types has advantages
and disadvantages compared to the others.
For example, while the existing federal system has all of the problems
set forth above (and more), state authority in this realm also poses some
problems. Although the fundamental geographic and accountability issues
posed by prosecutions by distant federal prosecutors might be mitigated by
use of local state prosecutors, new problems might arise. Given that the
329.
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federal system was justified by the notion that local state citizens were the
tribe's "deadliest enemies," we might see serious pushback and concern by
tribes in response to a proposal to turn criminal authority over to the states.
The cavalry effect that afflicts federal prosecutors might simply be replaced
by something even more pernicious. The problem of federal declination and
underprosecution could well be exacerbated or might even morph into the
opposite problem with an elected local prosecutor using aggressive prosecutions of Indians in some cases as a race-baiting appeal to the worst
tendencies of majority white voters in rural districts. In other words, the
political stakes in the outside community neighboring the reservation could
have negative effects on criminal justice on the reservation. Yet, despite the
problems related to federal and state prosecutors, real concerns might be
raised in some quarters about giving tribes more power over criminal justice. To outsiders (and sometimes to insiders), tribal governments are
sometimes viewed as being tugged in inappropriate directions by warring
political factions and the reputations of tribal officials are sometimes tarnished by assertions of corruptibility. As a result, some might view the
independence and lack of accountability of federal prosecutors as a distinct
advantage that helps them, in most cases, to make charging decisions in a
fairer and more objective fashion. As this analysis of the prosecutorial function illustrates, careful analysis for purposes of a reform agenda is a
complex task.
Moreover, any such analysis should recognize that the solution may not
involve a winner-take-all approach for the federal, state, or tribal governments. Because there are ways to split the criminal justice function between
governments, it is important also to examine the respective roles that each
government might play as to each institutional function. For example, the
average Indian country case now involves federal prosecutors appearing
before what amounts to state juries. And, through a self-government contract, an Indian tribe may well have provided the police investigative
services used in the case. In essence, the existing scheme is often one of
hybrid roles. It is important to recognize the fluidity of current allocations of
power and to recognize the possibility that such a hybridized or shared jurisdictional approach might be more fruitful than seeking to place all
functions within only one government.
In sum, a comprehensive analysis of reform must take a sober look at
the three governmental options and must compare and contrast the utility of
each in providing criminal justice in Indian country. In taking a hard look at
key portions of the federal system as it currently operates in Indian country,
this article has sought to begin that process.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution implicitly and explicitly recognizes that crime is a local problem and should be addressed by local institutions. Two of the key
institutions of American criminal justice, prosecutor and juries, have been
designed in such a way to execute this fundamental constitutional norm.
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Both prosecutors and juries, however, fail to meet their constitutionally envisioned responsibilities in federal Indian country cases, primarily because
they do not embrace the Constitution's clear preference for local criminal
justice solutions to local crime problems.
In most of the United States, addressing violent acts in criminal trials is
an expressive community act. Indeed, most felony prosecutions in this country are conducted under the direct authority of prosecutors who are elected
by the community they serve. Because the Indian country is dealt out of its
criminal justice system, the process of criminal justice on Indian reservations is neither an affirmation of community mores nor a formalized
expression of community outrage. To the local community, it is, at best, a
hollow effort. At worst, it is simply another imposition of authority by a
foreign government that does not even seriously intend to occupy the soil
upon which it seeks to impose its will. It is a relic of the colonialist roots of
the American criminal justice system.
The preference for local control in the American criminal justice system
has animated the Constitution for more than two centuries, and that has been
institutionalized in norms of American constitutional criminal procedure
since shortly after the Civil War. It is perhaps ironic that this preference for
local community control has a parallel in federal Indian policy. In the last
three decades, Congressional Indian policy has adopted the rhetoric of
"tribal self-determination." Local community representation in criminal justice and tribal self-determination in other areas of governance really are not
that different. Indeed, the theories underlying local criminal justice and
tribal self-determination spring from the same sources of liberal political
philosophy and are designed to serve similar interests. Thus, while the denial of tribal self-determination has constitutional ramifications for a federal
criminal justice system that denies local control of the key institutions of
criminal justice, tribal self-determination may offer one possible route out of
the existing morass.
If a fundamental principle of American governance and of criminal jurisprudence is that crime and criminal justice are local issues, then Indian
communities deserve a far greater role in the criminal justice system that
affects them. The United States Constitution may well demand it.
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